US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, and Publications
11-1-2015

The Hour of Truth: The Conflict in Ukraine–Implications for
Europe’s Energy Security and the Lessons for the U.S. Army
Ariel Cohen Dr.
Ivan Benovic Mr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Cohen, Ariel Dr. and Benovic, Ivan Mr., "The Hour of Truth: The Conflict in Ukraine–Implications for
Europe’s Energy Security and the Lessons for the U.S. Army" (2015). Monographs, Books, and
Publications. 434.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/434

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

The United States Army War College
The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service
at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application
of Landpower.
The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates
who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,
it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders
and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage
in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving
national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national
security and strategic research and analysis to influence
policy debate and bridge the gap between military
and academia.

CENTER for
STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes
to the education of world class senior leaders,
develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions
to strategic Army issues affecting the national
security community.
The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
provides subject matter expertise, technical review,
and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability
operations concepts and doctrines.
The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.
The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use
to support the U.S. Army, educate an international
audience, and honor soldiers—past and present.

i

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related
to national security and military strategy with emphasis on
geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct
strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern
topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of
Defense, and the larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics
of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings
of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip
reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the
Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army
participation in national security policy formulation.
iii

Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press

THE HOUR OF TRUTH:
THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE—IMPLICATIONS
FOR EUROPE’S ENERGY SECURITY
AND THE LESSONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

Ariel Cohen
Ivan Benovic
November 2015
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense,
the U.S. Government, or the government of any other
country. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full
academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be
copyrighted.

v

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should
be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn
Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.
*****
This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War
College External Research Associates Program. Information on
this program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudies
Institute.army.mil, at the Opportunities tab.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War
College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free
of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may
also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing
an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted
or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate
credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War
College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update
the national security community on the research of our analysts,
recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides
a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you
are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the
SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-709-X

vi

FOREWORD
A large part of Europe, especially Eastern, Northern, Central, and South-Central Europe including the
Balkans, has been dependent on Russian natural gas
since the Soviet times. Little changed with the breakup
of the Soviet Union as Russia was no longer perceived
as a strategic adversary. Moreover, Russia’s dependence on gas sales in Europe as a source of important
revenue for the state-owned Gazprom was considered
a guarantee against the use of gas supply as a strategic
tool by Moscow.
However, a dependence on the Russian energy
supply resulting from a system of pipelines built back
during the Cold War has increasingly proved to be a
disrupting, negative factor in European energy security. This dependence already has negatively manifested itself several times throughout the region and has
a potential to massively disrupt European military,
economic, and humanitarian situations if a substantial and/or prolonged interruption of the gas supply
occurs.
The ongoing hostilities in Ukraine demonstrated
the adverse effects of the continuing dependence on
Russian gas and on the top Russian national leaders
who call the shots on the Russian supply. In view of
supply interruptions and threats to cut the vital shipments of gas, Russia can no longer be considered a
stable and reliable supplier. Moscow has a track record of using its gas monopoly not only as a means
to extort disproportionately high prices for Western
consumers, but also as a means of exerting political
pressure to diminish U.S. influence in Europe and to
drive a wedge between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.
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In case Russia turns off its gas supplies to Europe,
European countries have limited supplies of stored gas
(usually only enough for 1 to 2 months of consumption). Supply interruptions would cause significant
losses for national economies. Therefore, to diminish
the probability of a conflict in Europe that eventually may require U.S. military intervention, there is
a need for European countries to diversify their gas
supplies and find more varied, reliable, and predictable gas suppliers. Thus, in the long run, the European
Union will have a choice between cheaper but politically unreliable Russian piped gas—and the more expensive but more reliable supplies of liquid natural
gas from the United States and from other sources
around the globe, as well as piped gas from Europe’s
neighborhoods.
The U.S. Government has been involved in European energy security for over 20 years, with the Bill
Clinton and George Bush administrations’ support
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Oil Export Pipeline
and of the Southern Corridor. U.S. forces in Europe,
and the U.S. Army in particular, can and should play
an important role in promoting energy security, as
this monograph demonstrates. The U.S. Army, as a
part of the U.S. military and the leading component
of NATO, needs to increase its situational awareness
with regards to the role of energy in security and the
possible future defense of the North Atlantic Alliance.
Protection of critical gas facilities and gas transport
infrastructure should be an important part of NATO’s
European strategy.
The U.S. Army has the know-how and capabilities to be an effective and reliable partner for European militaries in developing a system of monitoring
threats to critical infrastructure, which will help to
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effectively protect energy infrastructure from potential
sabotage efforts. Furthermore, the U.S. Army can plan
for adverse scenarios, train and equip regular allied
armies and irregular friendly forces for energy-related
emergencies, and for handling scenarios affecting the
economic well-being of the member continent.
Security of the energy supply is a crucial area for
U.S. Transatlantic security interests and will remain
a top NATO/European Command responsibility for
years to come.
		
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Natural gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine
have occurred repeatedly since the breakup of the Soviet Union. However, the 2014-15 wave of these conflicts was also coupled with a Russian-supported war
in eastern Ukraine. This warfare, together with Gazprom’s shortsighted attitude to its customers’ needs
and concerns, has made Russia’s natural gas supplies
unreliable in the eyes of the European Union (EU)
members. Given the dependence of the Old Continent
on outside sources of natural gas, the unreliable record of Russia as a supplier has boosted regional cooperation and incentivized the EU as a whole to seek
solutions to its dangerous dependence. For now, the
viable solutions for the EU include a partial diversification of the piped supplies to incorporate gas from the
Caspian region and potentially North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean, coupled with increased amounts
of gas available as liquified natural gas (LNG) after
European interconnectors and the multitude of LNG
projects across the world come online.
The U.S. Government has been involved in European energy security for over 20 years, and U.S. forces
in Europe, and the U.S. Army in particular, can and
should play an important role in promoting energy
security, as this monograph demonstrates. The U.S.
Armed Forces have played an important role in providing European security since World War II. Today,
the U.S. military’s role in European energy security
can include a comprehensive assessment of the security of European energy imports, including natural
gas, coal, uranium, and oil. The United States and its
allies should monitor the threats to pipelines and to
the natural gas balance through the U.S. intelligence
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community and their counterparts in Europe, Turkey,
and the Middle East, and share intelligence where
possible.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
can develop, in cooperation with European Command
and Central Command, a system to monitor threats to
critical energy infrastructure, including to the intraEuropean gas network, especially as interconnectors
will be a key component of European gas independence from Russia. In particular, the U.S. Army should
develop joint threat assessment and emergency planning and response protocols as they relate to threats
to individual gas fields, pipelines, gas processing facilities, storage facilities, pumping stations, and other
crucial infrastructure components. NATO, as well as
the individual European, Middle Eastern and North
African countries, has interoperability standards and
joint tactics, techniques, and procedures which would
allow them to coordinate and cooperate in case of
threats to natural gas infrastructure as recently seen
in Algeria.1
The U.S. Army should:
•	
Cooperate with NATO, national militaries of
NATO members and non-NATO allies, their
intelligence services and law enforcement, as
well as with energy companies, to ensure security of pipelines and other gas facilities.
•	
Prepare for energy crisis-related disaster relief
in Europe in cooperation with European militaries in the NATO framework and the EU and
national emergency responders. The U.S. Army
should build on its experience in developing
infrastructure protection plans to outline similar plans, programs, and procedures in Europe.

xiv

•	
Train forces for critical energy infrastructure
protection. The United States has developed
an effective system of critical infrastructure
protection at home and can share its expertise
with its European allies.
•	
Train and equip local militaries and other
forces for energy infrastructure protection and
actively pursue those who are trying to destroy energy infrastructure. Thus, the struggle
against violent religious extremists is directly
connected to U.S. efforts to keep oil and gas
infrastructure, the electricity grids, ports, and
airports secure.
•	
Temporarily protect critical energy facilities
and infrastructure. While the United States is
in the process of training European forces to
protect energy infrastructure, it should use its
own capabilities to ensure proper protection of
the pipelines and facilities until the European
forces are capable of performing these tasks on
their own.
The U.S. Army deployed in Europe is a crucial
component to NATO providing regional security,
interacting with NATO and non-NATO allies, and
assisting in training these allies’ militaries.
ENDNOTE - SUMMARY
1. “Al Qaeda’s North African wing claims two Algerian attacks,” Reuters, June 8, 2015, available from www.
reuters.com/article/2015/06/08/ozatp-us-algeria-security-idAFKBN0OO0GZ20150608, accessed June 20, 2015.
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THE HOUR OF TRUTH:
THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE—IMPLICATIONS
FOR EUROPE’S ENERGY SECURITY AND THE
LESSONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY
Ariel Cohen
Ivan Benovic
INTRODUCTION
Europe’s Dependence on Russian Gas and the
War in Ukraine.
The series of gas disputes between Russia and
Ukraine since the breakup of the Soviet Union have
unveiled the unconditional dependence of Europe on
Russian piped gas. The last wave of gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine were also combined with
a violent conflict in eastern Ukraine, primarily in the
regions of Donetsk and Lugansk. These hostilities in
eastern Ukraine began in late-2013, when the then
pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich
refused to sign the Association Agreement with the
European Union (EU). This provoked anger among
mostly western Ukrainians who held high expectations for the association of their country with the EU
and felt betrayed. It led to the so-called Euromaidan
revolution, which resulted in the violent ousting of
Yanukovich and the transfer of power to an interim
pro-EU  government. This development of events in
turn sparked protests in eastern Ukraine among the
predominantly pro-Russian population, who are suspicious of the EU and other western international
structures. The hidden but unresolved tensions be-
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tween the two nations, peacefully coexisting since the
breakup of the Soviet Union, came to the surface. Russia supported the eastern separatist provinces, which
has led to a lingering civil war and despair in Ukraine.
Part of the war has been a new wave of gas disputes between the Russian gas giant Gazprom and the
Ukrainian national gas company Naftogaz. In the conflict with Ukraine, Russia has quickly switched from
trying to use its natural gas supplies to Ukraine as a
carrot to attempting to use them as a stick. Russia’s
behavior since the beginning of the conflict in lateNovember 2013 has demonstrated how easily Russia
can change its gas policies towards its customers, leaving little room for building stable expectations from
Moscow as a gas supplier.
In 2014, Europe once again became a hostage of a
gas dispute, which left little room for the EU to maneuver. It passively watched the conflict unfold and
tried to play the role of mediator and guarantor to secure gas supplies. This conflict has once again shown
the EU that its dependence on Russian natural gas,
without much ability to influence the Kremlin’s behavior, can have dire consequences if it is not solved
in time. However, it has also united the EU in its quest
for a way to break free of the dependence on Russian
natural gas.
History of the Importance of Oil and Gas
as Strategic Factors.
Natural gas and oil have played an important role
in European history for decades. Oil and its derivatives were used by ancient Babylonians in construction of their walls and towers, as well as for paving
their streets.1 The modern history of oil began in the
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middle of the 19th century, when Abraham Gesner
developed methods of distilling liquid fuels from oil.2
Thanks to easy manipulation, oil quickly increased its
importance simultaneously with the development of
transportation, both civil and military. The internal
combustion engine developed by Siegfried Marcus in
1864 has become the principal consumer of petroleum
fuels for over a century.3 The Western Ukrainian region of Boryslav in the Carpathian Mountains became
one of the first provinces of oil production in the 1820s,
supplying two million tons per year by the beginning
of the 20th century.4
Several years before the beginning of World War
I, Winston Churchill launched a wide process of modernization of the Royal Navy, which included a shift
from using coal to using oil to power ships. Aircraft,
battle tanks, and trucks, which were used for the first
time in large numbers in World War I, also consumed
large quantities of gasoline. The importance of oil became especially clear during War II when Nazi Germany did its best to open its way to the Caspian oil
fields controlled by the Soviet Union. In 1942, this German effort led to the battle for Stalingrad, which at the
time was the last obstacle for the Nazis on their way to
the oil fields of Azerbaijan. Most historians consider it
the bloodiest battle of World War II, and that, after being won by the Soviet Union at the expense of heavy
casualties, became the turning point and precipitated
Germany’s defeat. The operation resulted in around
1.1 million Red Army soldiers dead, wounded, or
missing; and more than 800 thousand dead, wounded,
captured, or missing soldiers on the side of the Axis.5
The significance of oil was also clear to the Allies.
In August 1943, the U.S. Air Force made an unsuccessful attempt to bomb nine oil refineries near the town
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of Ploesti, Romania, in an operation known as Operation TIDAL WAVE. The aim of the operation was to
curb fuel supplies to the Axis, with which Romania
sided during the war. The mission failed, the U.S. Air
Force suffered major casualties, and the bombed refineries were put back online in several weeks after the
bombing.6
Although natural gas, similarly to oil, was first discovered in ancient times, it did not become important
until much later. Natural gas acquired wide industrial
and domestic usage only after World War II, when the
technology became advanced enough for the United States and Europe to develop a complex system
of gas pipelines, which in turn gave rise to a multitude of gas-powered electricity generating turbines
and appliances, such as water heaters, oven ranges,
boilers, etc.7
Developed countries began building gas pipelines,
which ensured stable transport of natural gas from the
fields to individual consumers and industries hundreds of miles away. After World War II, the demand
for oil and gas became so high that many countries
blessed by these natural resources turned from nomadic or agrarian societies into raw materials suppliers with relatively small effort. The flipside of this
rapid influx of money into these countries has been
that it discouraged them from becoming competitive
in other sectors in the economy. Instead, they developed a phenomenon known as the “resource curse” or
“Dutch disease.”8
Russia, despite a broad-based, autarkic industrial
sector, has not escaped the resource curse. The abundance of oil significantly contributed to the Soviet industrialization in the first half of the 20th century, despite the human cost it entailed. Natural gas became
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a preferred fuel of the second half of the 20th century,
with development of Soyuz and Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhgorod pipelines launched in 1979 and 1984,
respectively.9
Russia joined the club of countries depending on
hydrocarbon exports. The initial advantage of the hydrocarbon export-based cash flow backfired against
Moscow in the late-1980s when it contributed in an
important way to bringing the Soviet Union to its
knees with the sharp decline in oil prices in 1986. This
decline was the result of Soviet over-dependence on
hydrocarbon hard currency exports and an apparent
deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia.10 As
the late Yegor Gaidar conclusively demonstrated, the
oil price collapse deprived the ailing Soviet economy
of crucial revenues and precipitated its collapse under
its own weight.11
Russia as an Unreliable Supplier and Ukraine
as an Unreliable Transit Country.
The Soviet legacy, shaped by communism which
taught people to circumvent and fool the system and
kept afloat by the easy hydrocarbon money, left its
footprint in the approach of both Russia and Ukraine
to international business. When it comes to the supply
of natural gas, both Russia and Ukraine have a record
of being unpredictable and unreliable partners of the
EU. Russia is an unreliable supplier because it uses its
monopoly power to extract short-term political concessions from its European partners and has proven to
be ready to manipulate the supplies to force its partners to accept its terms. In particular, Russia has several times decreased or cut off gas supplies to Ukraine
and to some European countries when Ukraine did
not pay the prices for gas dictated by the Kremlin. This
5

happened as early as March 1994,12 and then again in
2006 and 2009, as described later. EU countries not
as Kremlin-friendly as it would like them to be, such
as Estonia and Latvia, are not eligible for gas price
discounts.
Ukraine also proved that it might not always be a
reliable transit country. It has proven to be willing to
sacrifice the EU interests in its disputes with Russia in
order to exert price concessions. Taking the EU as a
hostage might have worked to deter Russia from cutting off gas supplies or at least lower the chances of
such steps from the Kremlin. However, as the recent
past shows, the EU has not been a very effective deterrence factor in the gas disputes between Russia and
Ukraine.
THE IMPORTANCE OF GAS
AS A FUEL FOR EUROPE
Overall Natural Gas Significance as a Bridge Fuel
between Fossil Fuels and Renewables.
Natural gas is considered a golden mean between
conventional fossil fuels and alternative renewable
sources of energy. The disadvantage of renewable
sources of energy is that they are economically not yet
justifiable and not fully practicable as base-load fuels.
Their production and usage needs to be systematically
subsidized, although the per-kilowatt costs are coming down over time.
On the other hand, the disadvantage of most fossil
fuels is that they place a heavy burden on the environment and contribute to the climate change. Natural gas lays in between. It is cheaper than renewable
sources of energy and significantly cleaner than most
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other fossil fuels. Therefore, the role of natural gas in
advanced economies is likely to grow in the future.
Consumption, Trends, and Usage.
Due to the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis,
characterized by low growth and development of energy-efficient technologies, natural gas consumption
in Europe has been stagnant or falling over the past
several years. According to Eurostat (the EU statistical
agency), in 2013, the EU consumption of natural gas
decreased by 0.4 percent in comparison with 2012,
when less than 5,000 terawatt hours (TWh) were used.
This is roughly equivalent to 450 billion cubic meters
(bcm).13
Levels of consumption fluctuate. According to Eurostat, the share of Russia in the overall EU imports of
natural gas rose drastically from around 17.5 percent
of all imports in 2012 to 30.9 percent in 2013.14 This is
an unexpected development after the steady decline in
the Russian share in the EU gas imports since 2003. In
2014, Russia remained EU’s main gas supplier, but its
share in the overall EU gas imports slightly declined
from 43 to 42 percent.15
According to preliminary data from Eurostat, the
overall EU consumption of natural gas fell by around
22 percent annually between the first quarter of 2014
and the same period of 2013.16 Overall, in 2014, EU
gas consumption fell by 10 percent relative to 2013,
according to preliminary estimates of the European
Commission.17 Because of that, EU imports of natural gas fell by around 8 percent over the same period.
However, this high number may be partly caused
by an exceptionally cold winter in early-2013, which
caused natural gas consumption to spike. Still, the
EU gas consumption has been steadily declining over
7

the past 5-year period from around 20.8 million TWh
in 2010 to around 18 million TWh in 2013.18 The reason for the drop in the overall EU gas consumption
is the fact that electricity consumption in the EU is
declining.
Contrary to the previous trends of the past several
years when Russian piped gas exports were slightly
falling, Russian exports of piped gas to the EU rapidly
increased in the last quarter of 2013 and reached historically record numbers of around 11-bcm in December 2013.19 For the first time, Russian gas imports to
the EU exceeded those from Norway. Unlike the gas
imports from Norway and North Africa, Russian gas
exports to the EU have also been increasing steadily
without the characteristic seasonal fluctuations between the winter and the summer months. Over the
past 2 years, during winter months, the EU has imported around twice as much gas from Norway and
North Africa as in summer.
LNG is another viable source of gas for Europe.
LNG imports to the EU have been in decline since
2011 due to high prices in comparison to piped gas.
Between 2011 and 2012, LNG imports fell by 28 percent.20 Between 2012 and 2013, the imports fell by
another 29.1 percent.21 In the first half of 2014, LNG
imports were 5 percent below their levels in the same
period of 2013. One of the reasons for this decline may
be the coincidence of the overall drop in gas consumption, together with Gazprom easing the contractual
“take-or-pay” obligations for the EU gas distribution
companies, making Russian gas more attractive. In
case of an insufficiently high demand for gas, this
principle may make it cheaper for the gas distribution companies to import the already contracted gas
from Gazprom rather than to pay the penalty for not
importing the required amount.
8

The majority of the drop in LNG imports were
accounted for by Greece (-52 percent), Belgium (-35
percent), Spain (-34 percent), the Netherlands (-32
percent), and the United Kingdom (UK -32 percent).22
By contrast, LNG imports to Asia have been growing
over the past couple of years, mainly due to the lucrative price margins in the Asian gas markets, with
China experiencing a 23 percent increase and South
Korea experiencing an 11 percent increase in volume
from 2012 to 2013.23 Thus, due to the imports decline,
the EU share in global LNG trade fell by 13 percentage points: from 29 percent to only 16 percent during 2009-13. In addition, 2 percent of the global LNG
market consisted of LNG re-exports, with around 95
percent of those re-exports coming from Europe. In an
era of high spot prices, the price differential between
the LNG price in Europe and the price in Asia made
it profitable for some companies to re-export already–
contracted gas back to Asia.
The total LNG regasification capacity in the EU
(i.e., the import capacity of the EU LNG terminals) is
around 200-bcm per year (as of the end of 2014, excluding small-scale LNG terminals), while by 2022,
this capacity is planned to be increased to 275-bcm.
This capacity should be sufficient to cover the EU’s
LNG import needs handily even in case of a substantial decline in imports of the Russian piped gas.
The supply constraints remain due to the limitations
in Europe’s internal pipeline network, especially of
Central Europe, as will be explained later in detail.
Coal: An Environmentally Problematic
Energy Source.
Besides CO2 emissions, burning coal pollutes the
environment with a range of toxic gasses, such as
9

SO2 and other toxic substances, such as NOx and SOx
known as soxes and noxes. Coal, especially “brown”
coal (lignite), is the most polluting source of electricity
if we take into account the ratio of emissions produced
per unit of generated electricity. Black coal (anthracite)
emits significantly fewer collateral toxins than brown
coal. However, anthracite actually produces 6 percent
higher CO2 emissions than lignite.24 Burning black
coal emits two times as much CO2 as burning natural
gas in order to produce the same amount of energy. In
addition to that, unlike natural gas, burning coal also
emits the toxic NOx and SOx.
In times when the EU is trying to find ways of curbing pollution and improving its environmental standards, other, cleaner sources of energy are and will be
preferred over coal. In particular, the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED No. 2010/75/EU), adopted by the
EU in 2010, states that industrial installations have to
ensure that they cause no significant pollution; that
their waste is reduced, recycled, or disposed of in the
manner which creates the least pollution; and that
they maximize their energy efficiency.25 The rules are
scheduled to go into effect in 2016.
One of the toughest components for coal power
plants to meet will be the NOx limits (200 microgram
per cubic meter) because burning coal produces large
quantities of such emissions. In addition to that, there
is space for a downward revision of the limit, which
would put additional burden to any industry burning
coal, and incentivize it to shift to natural gas. Figure 1
shows a comparison of the amount of CO2 emissions
from burning different types of fossil fuel.26
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Figure 1. Pounds of C02 Emitted per Million BTU.
EU energy companies already pay additional costs
under the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS), which
is designed to motivate the industries to modernize
and to pollute as little as possible. The UK came up
with an additional measure to curb its CO2 emissions.
It is the so called carbon price floor, which is basically
a UK national tax aimed at increasing the existing EU
price of carbon in case the price of carbon under the
EU ETS falls below a certain target. Such measures put
pressure on the energy firms and are likely to encourage them to shift to natural gas.
Vincent de Rivaz, chief executive of the ‘Electricite’
de France Energy, the UK’s largest producer of lowcarbon electricity, argues that the carbon price floor
and the EU policies aimed at reducing the carbon footprint are generally working.27 First, these measures are
encouraging firms to shift away from coal to low(er)carbon power generation. Second, they incentivize
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investment into renewable sources of power generation, such as wind, biomass, and nuclear. Under these
regulations, renewable sources are more economically
viable than would be the case if greenhouse gas emissions were not regulated. Given the widespread public suspicion of nuclear energy, especially after the Fukushima accident in March 2011, the strongest effect
of these policies is likely to be a continuing shift from
coal to natural gas—before shifting to renewables at a
larger scale when their economics improve.
However, another tendency is running opposite
to the EU efforts and is changing the calculations of
European energy companies in favor of burning more
coal. The U.S. shale gas revolution sent gas prices in
the United States to record lows and freed a large
quantity of U.S. coal for exports, which is increasingly
being purchased by Europe.28 In the first 6 months
of 2012, European purchases of American coal rose
by a third. Nevertheless, according to data from the
U.S. Energy Information Administration, this trend
changed in 2014, when U.S. exports of coal to Europe
declined from 60.8 million tons in 2013 to 52.5 million.
France and the UK saw the most significant decline in
imports in absolute numbers.29
Germany, which is at the forefront of the efforts
towards cleaner energy in the EU, continues to burn a
lot of coal to generate its electricity. In 2012, the share
of coal in the electricity production of Rheinisch-Westfalische Elektrizitatswerke, a German energy giant,
increased to 72 percent in the first 9 months of 2012,
compared to 66 percent in the same period of 2011.
This trend is expected to continue until 2016, when
the IED comes into force. However, due to a range of
exceptions in the IED, some coal power plants will be
able to continue operating for several years beyond
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2016 and its provisions will thus be diluted. Nevertheless, tougher EU pollution rules resulting from the
IED may push coal power plants out of business by
the early-2020s.30
High Cost and Other Challenges of Renewables.
Renewable energy has been a focus of the environmentalists mainly due to the contemporary environmental and global climate change concerns. Historically, therefore, governments bought renewable
energy paid for by various direct or indirect subsidies.
However, renewable sources of energy and the subsidies to make them more sustainable have had a side
effect of pushing electricity prices in Germany and
some European countries too high for the industry to
remain competitive in the long run. Some economists
believe that this may result in capital flight to destinations with cheaper energy, including the United
States.31
In Germany, the so-called “Energiewende,” or
“energy change,” is a large-scale project of the German government to shift from nuclear power and fossil fuels to renewables. The goal of this energy change
is to be producing 40 to 45 percent of its electricity
from renewables by 2025.32 However, there are worries that this energy change may undermine the German industrial base and drag down the entire European economy due to the spillover effects. The average
electricity prices for companies have risen by around
60 percent over the past 5 years. These increasing
electricity prices are considered a major concern for
around 75 percent of Germany’s small and mediumsize industrial businesses.
Another negative consequence of the German efforts to increase the share of renewables in its energy
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production is the public protests it sparks. The new
sources of energy will also need new transmission lines
and other infrastructure that will have to run through
new lands. This leads to the traditional NIMBY (“not
in my backyard”) problem. For instance, people in
many German villages have protested against power
companies laying transmission cables over their villages. They are afraid of the effect of such transmission lines on health due to low frequency radiation,
of the potential negative impact on tourism as the
landscapes will not be as picturesque as before, etc.
Regardless of whether these fears are justified or not,
they are an additional factor that makes overcoming
the dependence on fossil fuels even more difficult.
Other countries have targets that are more modest when it comes to the share of renewables in their
energy mix. France’s goal is to increase the share of renewables in its gross final energy production by 2020
by around 13 percentage points compared to 2005.33
This may still prove to be too ambitious. According
to the EU Directive 2009/28/EC, 17 percent of Italy’s
energy consumption has to be covered by renewable
sources, compared to 4.92 percent in 2005.34 Overall,
regardless of how successful Germany is with its Energiewende and how successful the other EU countries are in achieving their aforementioned goals, both
Germany and the rest of the EU will inevitably need
fossil fuels in the foreseeable future. Due to the environmental constraints, the one fossil fuel in highest
demand will most likely be natural gas.
Current economic growth forecasts for the EU tend
to be moderately positive. Moody’s projects economic
growth to be 1 and 1.5 percent in 2015 and 2016, respectively.35 Nevertheless, according to Moody’s Investors
Service, a number of EU countries, such as Italy, Por-
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tugal, and Spain, are not expected to reach even their
pre-crisis gross domestic product (GDP) levels by the
end of 2016. In the longer run, the EU’s real economic
growth is projected to be positive, within the range of
2 to 3 percent until 2025, with a tendency to slightly
slow down towards the end of the period.36 Therefore,
given the sluggish EU growth projected for the next
10 years and no clear improvement on the horizon,
coupled with gradually increasing energy efficiency
across the continent, one should not expect a significant rise in gas consumption in the EU.
CURRENT AND POTENTIAL GAS ROUTES
FROM RUSSIA TO EUROPE
Ukraine.
Currently, Ukraine is still one of the main transit
routes for Russian gas flowing to Europe. Natural gas
flows to Ukraine by 22 major gas pipelines (Soyuz,
Progress, Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod, etc.) and
leaves the country by 15 pipelines. As of July 2014,
Ukraine’s gas grid looked like Figure 2.37
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Source: East European Gas Analysis.

Figure 2. Ukraine’s Gas Pipeline Network
as of July 2014.
The history of the Ukrainian gas pipeline network
dates back to the 1910s, when the first gas pipeline
was constructed in the region of L’viv/Lemberg/
Lvov.38 In 1945, Ukraine first started exporting natural
gas, with its first destination being Poland. In 1948, the
Dashava-Kyiv gas pipeline—the largest gas pipeline
in Europe at the time—was put into operation, and in
1951, the pipeline reached Moscow. The construction
of the pipelines continued, with new pipelines being
built in 1960 and 1967. These new pipelines allowed
Ukraine to export gas to Belarus and to today’s EU
countries, such as Austria and the Czech Republic.
The break-up of the Soviet Union plunged the
Ukrainian gas pipeline network into a crisis. The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) did not
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design major pipelines as international gas transit
routes; they became a part of an international gas export system years after they were constructed.39 This
has led to the fact that the transit of the gas could not
be operated independently of Ukraine’s now domestic gas network. In addition, most of the system was
built in the Brezhnev era, and, due to the natural life
span of the pipelines, maintenance and repair costs
have risen since the break-up of the USSR.
Belarus.
Belarus has been an important transit country for
the Russian gas since 1999, when the Yamal pipeline
was launched. In 2005, the pipeline reached its projected capacity of 33-bcm of gas per year. Before that,
Ukraine was the only transit route of the Russian gas
to Europe, which put both Russia and Europe at risk
of supply cutoffs. While Gazprom owns the section of
the pipeline in the territory of the Russian Federation,
Beltransgaz owns the Belarusian section. However,
Beltransgaz is entirely owned by Gazprom, which allows Gazprom to control the Belarusian section of the
pipeline. Belarus pays only around $160 per 1,000 cubic meters of Russian gas—significantly less than the
EU countries.
Nord Stream.
The Nord Stream was launched in September 2011
in response to the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of 2009.
Its second thread was launched in 2012, doubling its
capacity. Both threads of the pipeline transfer around
55-bcm of gas per year directly from Russia to Germany. This pipeline allowed Russia to redirect a part
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of its gas exports to Europe from their initial route to
Ukraine and transfer this gas directly to its end consumers in Europe. This pipeline has faced a great deal
of criticism from a wide array of experts and policymakers. For instance, Radoslaw Sikorski, Speaker
of the Sejm and Poland’s former foreign minister,
compared this pipeline to the infamous RibbentropMolotov Pact of 1939, as a result of which Germany
and the Soviet Union invaded Poland, thus launching
World War II. There are also fears that Russia might
use this pipeline for attempts to exert political concessions from the EU.
The Nord Stream project, which German companies would like to expand further, together with
Russia’s refusal to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty,
poses a security risk to Europe. It increases Europe’s
dependence on Russian gas, facilitating Russia’s ability to use its gas supplies as leverage against the EU in
order to foster the pro-Kremlin policies. Among other
things, Russia’s refusal to ratify the Treaty stems from
its desire to have less competition among its European gas consumers, which currently allows Gazprom
to charge each of its European consumer countries a
different price—a practice forbidden by the Treaty.
In other words, Gazprom has pursued the “divide
and rule” policy, which allowed it to pressure each
European country dependent on its gas to exert more
favorable terms both economically and politically.
Gazprom’s influence could be observed for the
past 1 1/2 years when the EU was conducting internal negotiations about imposing sanctions on Russia
due to its annexation of the Crimea and support for
eastern Ukrainian separatists. Although Russian gas
was not the only factor, the Central European countries, such as Hungary, Austria, and Slovakia, as well
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as Serbia that depend more on Russian gas, tended to
promote a more reserved policy towards imposing
sanctions on Russia due to their concerns about their
gas supplies.
South Stream and Its Alternatives after the
Cancellation of the Project.
The original goal of the South Stream, the construction of which was canceled in December 2014, was
to deliver Russian gas directly to the EU, bypassing
Ukraine. Russia hoped that by building and launching
the South Stream, it would solve the recurring problem of insecure transit through Ukraine and would
strengthen its position in its negotiations with Kyiv.
The capacity of the South Stream was planned to be
63-bcm per year, which is equivalent to around 12 percent of the EU gas consumption in 2014.
According to the initial plans, the South Stream
was expected to be operational by 2018. The pipeline
was planned to run from Russia, through the Black
Sea, through Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary to Austria. However, since the beginning of its construction,
the South Stream posed a dilemma for Europe. On the
one hand, it would contribute to the independence of
Europe from Ukraine as a gas transit country. On the
other, it would further increase European dependence
on Russian gas and make alternative routes commercially unattractive.
The construction of the pipeline was fraught with
problems from its very beginning. In June 2014, the
European Commission voiced its concerns about the
compliance of the construction of the South Stream
in Bulgaria with the EU legislation.40 The main problems were that, according to the agreements between
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Bulgaria and Gazprom, Gazprom was able to circumvent the EU competition rules and that Russian and
Bulgarian sub-contractors would be given preference
in public procurement for the construction of the
pipeline.
In August 2014, Bulgaria announced that it ceased
work on the construction of its section of the pipeline.41
A 541 kilometers (km)-long section of the pipeline was
planned to run through the country. Then Bulgarian
Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski announced this
decision shortly after his meeting with U.S. Senators
John McCain, Chris Murphy, and Ron Johnson in
Bulgaria, which triggered speculations in the Russian
media about the potential U.S. involvement in the decision and that pressure was put on Bulgaria to adopt
such a decision. At the same time, Bulgaria says the
project is “irreversible and important for both Europe
and Bulgaria.”42
After Bulgaria, the Serbian government, in particular Serbian former transport minister Zorana Mikhajlovic, also announced that Serbia would be suspending work on its part of the South Stream.43 Presumably,
the reason was that Serbia was waiting for the resolution of the dispute between the European Commission
and Bulgaria regarding the Bulgarian section of the
pipeline. However, later, the Serbian Prime Minister
Alexander Vucic denied Mikhajlovic’s announcement
and said that the work was continuing as planned.44
According to the Russian media, it was a matter of
time until someone in Serbia would take advantage
of the fact that Bulgaria suspended work on its part
of the pipeline and would push for the same thing in
Serbia.45 Serbia is trying to sit on two chairs at once—
to maintain its friendly ties with Moscow and to be a
responsible ally of the West. According to the Russian
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media, the decision of Bulgaria to suspend the construction of the pipeline, and also the Serbian voices
to do the same, seemed to be a result of the pressure
from the West to sanction Russia, in addition to the direct sanctions imposed by Brussels and Washington.
Serbia, as a country aspiring to join the EU and suffering from a severely diminished geopolitical clout, had
to adapt to the changing environment.
On December 2, 2014, Russian President Vladimir
Putin announced during his official visit to Turkey
that construction of the South Stream project would
not continue.46 On the one hand, this is good news for
Ukraine and other transit countries, such as Slovakia,
which will continue receiving millions of dollars for
transit of gas to Central Europe and further to the
West. As long as the EU needs Russian gas, Ukraine
will continue to serve as an important gas transit
route, because the Nord Stream, which transports gas
directly from Russia to Germany, is not able to supply
all the Russian gas the EU may need.
On the other, this is a defeat for Russia. Due to the
introduction of the EU third energy package and the
related compliance issues, and following the EU sanctions against Russia, the completion of this project
became virtually impossible. The decision to end the
project prematurely also means that Russia suffered
a loss of around $9.4 billion, for which they will not
be reimbursed. After the announcement of the South
Stream closure, Russia proclaimed that it now intends
to concentrate on building a hub near the TurkishBulgarian border and on supplying gas to Turkey
through the new project called Turkstream. Instead of
the South Stream, Russia intends to build a new pipeline to Turkey with the projected capacity of 63-bcm
per year—same as the South Stream.
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Turkey is expected to consume only 16-bcm of that
volume.47 The remaining 40-bcm is to be distributed
to the Balkans and to Central Europe. Russia also intends to build a gas hub at the Turkish-Bulgarian border. This gas hub would be open for Bulgaria, Serbia,
and other Balkan countries in case the EU reconsiders its previous stance and decides to connect to the
southern route of the Russian gas. This seems to be
the second best option after the South Stream. In case
the EU decides to connect, no matter how unlikely in
practice that is, Russia would achieve its original goal
to transport gas to the EU through the Balkans, albeit
with higher upfront costs for construction of the infrastructure.
The decision to stop construction of the South
Stream opens up alternative variants of transporting
Russian gas to the Balkans. For instance, Eustream,
the Slovak gas pipeline operator, proposed to build
a pipeline from Western Europe through Slovakia to
Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and possibly
the Balkans.48 The project would be called Eastring
and should be able to alleviate the strong dependence
of some Balkan countries on Russian gas. Serbia and
Bulgaria would be able to receive gas even if the transit of gas through Ukraine is cut off. The pipeline that
needs to be constructed would be only 570-km long,
as it would also take advantage of the already existing pipeline network. This new section of the pipeline
would go mainly through Romania and would connect to the main Balkan pipeline running to the shore
of the Black Sea. The proposed capacity of this new
project is 20-bcm per year. It would be able to supply
the Balkans with either Russian or Western gas.

22

Liquefied Natural Gas.
One of the most viable alternatives to Russian gas
is liquefied natural gas (LNG). The EU currently imports LNG mainly from the Middle East, especially
Qatar, but supplies from the United States are expected to come online in the next several years. LNG
exports from the United States also seem promising if,
after the U.S. LNG becomes available in 2018, the cost
is price-competitive against Russian pipelined gas.
The question is whether U.S. gas can become a perfect
substitute in terms of price, reliability, and quantity.49
First, liquefaction and transportation of the gas adds
a significant amount to the cost, which may deprive
the U.S. LNG of its initially expected competitive advantage. Second, U.S. LNG exports may raise domestic prices because part of the gas that would normally
end up in the United States will then be exported at
higher price margins. There are three answers to these
arguments. First, the Europeans, including the Lithuanians who have built a floating regasification terminal, would like to add U.S.-produced natural gas to
the source mix for security reasons. Second, production efficiencies still keep the gas competitive on price.
Finally, the higher domestic price of the U.S. gas is in
the interest of the gas industry.
STRATEGIC DEPENDENCE OF EUROPE
ON RUSSIAN GAS AND RUSSIA-UKRAINE
GAS DISPUTES
Dependence of Western Europe on Russian Gas.
Russia constitutes a relatively small share of the
Western Europe gas consumption which varies by
country. For now, the UK has its own gas sources and
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does not need to rely on gas imports. Spain gets its
gas from North Africa, mainly Algeria, which in 2013
supplied 39 percent of Spain’s gas needs.50 France purchased approximately 19 percent of its gas from Russia in 2013.51 Approximately 48 percent of Germany’s
gas needs were met by Russian gas imports in 2013,
mainly through the Nord Stream pipeline. Italy and
Austria depend on Russian gas imports for 39 and 60
percent, respectively. Thus, most countries of Western
Europe cover a significant share of their gas consumption by Russian gas imports.
Dependence of Eastern and Central Europe
on Russian Gas.
Although the percentages within the region vary,
Central and Eastern Europe depend significantly
more on Russian gas imports than does Western Europe. The countries that depend most on Russia are
the Baltic States, which purchase 100 percent of their
gas from Russia.52 This is about to change: Estonia
is planning to build a pipeline to connect it to Finland to receive Norwegian gas. Lithuania has built a
floating liquefied natural gas terminal as mentioned
previously.53
Central Europe imports less percentage-wise, but
not significantly. In 2013, the Czech Republic and Slovakia imported 86 and 98 percent of their gas from
Russia, respectively. Poland and Hungary imported
57 and 68 percent, respectively. Bulgaria imported 93
percent of its gas from Russia in 2013,54 and Romania
imported around 10 percent.55 Thus, it is the Baltic
States, Central Europe, and the Balkans that depend
most on Russian gas, and this is why the EU does not
have as much space for maneuver vis-à-vis Russia as
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it might if the dependence of several of its members
was not as high.
Seasonal Dependence.
European gas consumption varies dramatically
between the seasons: summer consumption is as little
as 40 percent of the winter consumption. Thus, the
dependence of Europe on Russian gas is the lowest
in summer and the highest in winter due to heating
needs and shorter days, which require more lighting.
Therefore, in summer, Europe, on average, depends
less on Russian gas and would be able to cover its consumption by exploiting sources of gas other than Russia, especially if Europe builds an efficient network of
pipeline interconnectors between the EU countries.
Additionally, in summer, gas companies are usually
refilling their reservoirs in preparation for the upcoming winter, driving up otherwise sluggish demand.
Disputes in the 1990s.
Strains in the Russian-Ukrainian natural gas relations appeared at the dawn of Ukraine’s political
independence in the first half of the 1990s. The problems that lay at the core of the disputes were similar to
the ones in subsequent gas conflicts between the two
countries: Ukraine was unwilling and unable to pay
for the gas it was receiving from Russia, while Russia
kept lowering its gas supplies to Ukraine in order to
force it to improve its payment discipline.
As a result, the amounts of gas transited through
Ukraine to Europe kept fluctuating. Even worse for
Europe was that, in the 1990s, Ukraine was the only
transit route for the Russian gas that Europe received,
highlighting the importance of Russian-Ukrainian
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and Russian-European relations. A complicating factor was Ukraine’s energy inefficiency, which resulted
from the Soviet legacy.56 The USSR functioned without
a convertible hard currency—instead, the ruble was a
fiat money, with Gosplan central planning, and only
with a tenuous accounting system.
This situation has defined the energy sector as
well. In 1991, Ukraine’s total fossil fuel consumption
amounted to 202 million tons of oil equivalent, out of
which approximately 50 percent was imported.57 As
for natural gas, Ukraine imported 77 percent of the gas
it consumed that year, while producing the rest from
its domestic gas wells. Ukraine’s industry, which was
built on the Soviet cheap energy and was largely energy inefficient, was responsible for the excessive consumption. The high degree of dependence on Russian
energy supplies did not allow Ukraine to attain real
independence from Russia. By early-1994, Ukraine’s
debt to Russia was estimated to be around $2 billion,
most of which was the Ukrainian debt for Russian
gas.58 In this situation, Russia could either change the
supplied volumes of gas or change its price. Moscow
already had started using natural gas as a political leverage. It offered discounted gas prices to the other
former Soviet Union countries in exchange for political concessions, mainly participating in Russia-led
political integration organizations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This Russian negotiation tactic went the furthest with Belarus,
which is now part of a so-called “united state” with
Russia. Belarus has lost most of its independence in
exchange for cheap oil and gas and the intermediary
role in energy trade.
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper published in 1997 argues that the main reasons for the
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piling up of the Ukrainian debt in the 1990s was the
sluggish growth of its economy, government intervention in the energy prices to keep up subsidies for
households, and privileged oligarchs. Other government nonprice interventions in the gas market, such
as setting regional consumption quotas or the laxity
in the enforcement of sanctions towards nonpayers,
played a role in the mushrooming debt as well.59 Thus,
the government could not pay Gazprom because the
government itself suffered from lack of payments
due to its own policies and limitations. Russia used
this piling debt as leverage to achieve its geopolitical objectives, including the deployment of the Black
Sea Fleet in Crimea, the return of the Soviet nuclear
arsenal60 deployed in Ukraine before the breakup of
the Soviet Union, etc. By carefully adjusting the gas
price for Ukraine while keeping it below the market
level, Russia achieved two objectives simultaneously:
It kept Ukraine relatively afloat economically, ensuring at least partial payments, and at the same time
achieved its strategic priorities.
The Russian-Ukrainian gas relations in the 1990s
reached their bottom in 1993-94, when the first gas crisis erupted between Kyiv and Moscow. The Russian
pursuit of ownership and control of Ukrainian gas
and oil facilities, instead of merely seeking political
concessions from Kyiv, triggered a shift in the policy.
If Russia had taken ownership of the Ukrainian gas
network, it would have deprived Ukraine of its major leverage, i.e., its ability to keep Europe hostage
by stopping the transit of Russian gas. Such a step by
Moscow inevitably would outrage Europe, a major
source of hard currency revenue for Russia, which
was at that time politically and economically much
weaker than in the 2000s.
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In February 1994, Gazprom started reducing
its gas supplies to Ukraine due to the country’s piling debt. Moscow reduced the supplies to around
10 percent of their original volume. Russian officials
emphasized that they were ready to accept property
rights of the Ukrainian gas network as a substitute for
Ukraine repaying its $1 billion gas debt in cash. The
parties reached an initial preliminary deal in March
that Ukraine would repay part of its gas debt, and
that Gazprom would acquire a 51 percent share of the
Ukrainian gas transit network. However, in the end,
the parties did not strike a deal.
Instead, Ukraine passed laws to prevent its gas
transit network from being privatized and became
more prompt with paying its gas bills, which was facilitated by the help of Western financial institutions.
In early-May 2014, Ukraine received the first tranche
of $3.19 billion of its $17 billion IMF package, using
a part of the amount to pay Ukraine’s overdue gas
bills to Gazprom.61 The IMF acknowledged that part
of the package would be used to pay off both overdue and future energy bills, while the rest was aimed
at supporting the Ukrainian economy. It seemed that
Ukraine learned its lesson that the Russian threats of
cutting off the gas supplies can be prevented by paying its gas bills on time, which would deprive Russia
of most of its economic incentives and political excuses
to cut off its gas supplies. However, Ukraine did not
learn its lesson and started again piling debt, which
resulted in a series of gas disputes in the 21st century
(see infra). In the meantime, Russia continued behaving as a traditionalist power, backing its diplomacy by
force and coercion.62
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Gas Dispute of 2005-06.
In May 2005, an issue between Gazprom and
Ukraine emerged regarding the usability of Gazprom’s gas in the reservoirs on the Ukrainian territory for sales to Europe. Gazprom made 40 requests
to Ukraine between October 14, 2014, and March 22,
2005, to make the stored gas available.63 Ukraine did
not approve any of these requests. In turn, Gazprom
threatened to subtract the volumes from its transit inkind payments, which would mean a serious shortage
of gas for Ukraine. In turn, Ukraine threatened to use
part of the gas intended for European sales for its own
needs, which could jeopardize the continuity of gas
supplies to the EU. This incident was later resolved
with an agreement to release the withheld amounts of
gas to Russia.
In 2005, the Ukrainian government, led at the time
by President Viktor Yushchenko, raised objections to
the earlier amount of natural gas debt that Ukraine
had agreed to pay to Moscow, calling the amount
excessive. As the oil prices skyrocketed in the 2000s,
the gas prices, which were indexed to oil, also mushroomed, causing the debt to spike. Russia complained
about Ukraine and other CIS countries paying three
to four times less than the price the EU countries were
paying.
Gazprom demanded Ukraine to either start paying EU-level prices from the beginning of 2006 or allow Gazprom to acquire a share in the Ukrainian gas
transit pipeline network (similar to the demand of the
mid-1990s). Ukraine responded as it did in the 1990s,
saying that it was ready to pay the market price, but
under a condition that the transfer to the market price
would have to be gradual. The initially hardline stance
of Gazprom and the Russian leadership softened. Gaz29

prom announced that it was ready to provide loans to
Ukraine, which Ukraine would then use to pay Russia
back for its gas.
However, Ukraine rejected this Russian proposal.
Gazprom in turn cut off its supplies to Ukraine. Gazprom insisted that it was pumping enough gas intended for Europe, while Ukraine claimed that it did
not divert any gas from the system and passed the
entire amount through its territory to the EU. The EU
countries that were most affected by the cutoff were
Hungary, Austria, Slovakia, Romania, France, Poland,
and Italy. The crisis lasted only for several days. On
January 4, 2006, gas deliveries to the EU were restored
to their previous levels, and end consumers in the EU
did not experience shortfalls due to national gas reserves and a mild winter at that time.
Although an agreement between Russia’s Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftogaz was reached, it resolved largely secondary issues, e.g., the modalities of
distributing gas in Ukraine and the transit fee for the
gas exported to the EU. The primary issue, which was
the long-term price for gas consumed by Ukraine, and
Kyiv’s inability to sustain its gas “habit,” remained unresolved. This dispute was another example of Russia
attempting to blackmail Ukraine by using gas prices to
pursue its political goals. Belarus and other countries
with more Russia-friendly governments than Ukraine
were paying a fraction of the price Ukraine was forced
to pay. Despite the crisis’s short duration, it damaged
the trust of the EU members in Russia’s reliability as a
gas supplier—something Russia further undermined
in January 2009 and continues doing to this day. The
EU realized that it was not strategically beneficial to be
overly dependent on a single gas supplier, especially
if that oligopolistic gas supplier was as unpredictable
as Russia.
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Gas Dispute of 2009.
The gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in
January 2009 has so far been the most serious of its
kind. It was not as long as the conflict of 2014, but was
more intense and led to direct economic losses for
Russia, Ukraine, and the EU countries of Central Europe. Similar to the previous disputes, the core of the
2009 gas conflict was the sale price for the Russian gas.
Russia increased the gas price from $130 in 2007 to
$179.50 per 1,000 cubic meters in 2008.64 Information
about Ukraine illicitly diverting gas from its transit
network for resale started appearing in February 2008.
In March 2008, Gazprom lowered the pressure in the
Ukrainian transit network, leading to lower volumes.
Naftogaz responded by warning that, given the situation, it could not guarantee stability of the gas transit
to the EU.
The two countries attempted to resolve the issue,
but ran into problems. In October 2008, Putin and the
then-Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko
signed a memorandum on the future cooperation between the two countries in the gas sphere. The memorandum provided for a gradual increase in import
prices and transit tariffs, recognized the necessity to
ensure uninterrupted gas transit through Ukraine,
designated Naftogaz as the monopoly importer of
Russian gas to Ukraine, and provided for joint Russian-Ukrainian gas exports to Europe.
Two weeks later, the chief executive officers
(CEOs) of Gazprom and Naftogaz, Alexey Miller and
Oleg Dubyna, signed another agreement. Among
other things, it foresaw a gas contract to be signed in
November 2008 and specified the guarantee of unin-
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terrupted gas transit by Naftogaz at a minimum of
120-bcm per year. However, Gazprom and Naftogaz
failed to reach an agreement on the import price from
January 2009 onwards. Ukraine was unwilling to
agree on a new, higher price as Naftogaz still owed
Gazprom considerable sums of money for Gazprom’s
previous gas deliveries. By the middle of December
2008, Naftogaz had paid only $800 million of an accumulated $2.2 billion debt. Moreover, Naftogaz rejected Gazprom’s offer to pay for its transit in advance
and thus provide Naftogaz with enough resources to
pay its gas debts.
In November 2008, Alexey Miller said that, if the
parties do not sign a new supply contract by the end
of the year, the price for Ukraine from January 2009
onwards would be $400 per 1,000 cubic meters. Putin
added that, if the contract was not signed, supplies
to Ukraine would end. The EU did not take an active
position at that time. The EU’s only response to these
warnings was a press release in which it called upon
the parties to adhere to the principle of uninterrupted
transit. On December 31, 2008, Naftogaz allegedly
informed Gazprom that if Gazprom sent transit gas
through Ukraine, this gas would be confiscated by
Ukraine. On January 1, 2009, Gazprom cut all supplies
to Ukraine, while it continued to pump the transit gas
for the EU customers into the Ukrainian network. On
January 4, 2009, Gazprom accused Ukraine of allegedly having stolen 50 million cubic meters (mcm) of
gas, which did not belong to Naftogaz, from the gas
stream intended for the EU and from the underground
reservoirs.
On January 5, the amount of allegedly syphoned
gas rose to 63-mcm. Naftogaz claimed that around 25mcm was necessary to operate the pipeline network in
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the conditions of a lower gas pressure from Russia, and
that it was “entitled” to take that volume out of the European transit volumes. On January 5, Putin and Miller
decided to cut the gas supplies to Ukraine entirely. On
January 6, Gazprom significantly reduced its supplies
and on January 7, the company cut off the supplies
completely.
Only at that point did the EU take action. It put
together a monitoring mission composed of representatives of both sides to the dispute, as well as of the EU
itself and European gas companies. The monitoring
mission was deployed on January 11-12, 2009. Mutual
accusations between Russia and Ukraine of being responsible for the gas deliveries cut off continued. Gazprom claimed it was willing to ship gas to Ukraine,
but Naftogaz blocked Gazprom’s attempts. Naftogaz
claimed that no gas was being shipped. European gas
companies started pressuring Gazprom for a resolution of the dispute. On January 19, 2009, Gazprom and
Naftogaz signed two new contracts—one on the supply and one on the transit of gas. Gazprom resumed
its gas shipments on January 20, 2009, and by January
22, the shipments reached their original levels. Russia and Ukraine agreed on a base price of $450 per
1,000 cubic meters, which was subsequently lowered
to $360 by a 20 percent discount.65 This discount was
officially explained by the fact that, despite raising
the price by Gazprom, the transit price Gazprom was
charged by Naftogaz for transiting through Ukraine’s
territory was left unchanged at its 2008 level—$1.7 per
1,000 cubic meters of gas per 100-km. However, the
real reason behind this scheme (a high base price lowered by means of a discount) may have been different. It provided Russia with maneuvering space and
allowed it to manipulate the price without breaching
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the contract. In particular, Gazprom was not legally
tied to the price of $360 per 1,000-m3, and could flexibly and arbitrarily raise it in case the Kremlin saw a
need to put the Ukrainian government under more
pressure.
This dispute seriously shattered the reliability of
Russia as a stable and predictable gas supplier and
served as an incentive for the EU countries to look for
alternatives. Before the dispute, there were discussions in the EU about potential diversification, but not
much had been done in this regard.
Gas Dispute of 2014.
The 2009 gas crisis, which resulted in a gas contract
between Russia and Ukraine, created a potential for a
new gas conflict to emerge later. The 2009 gas contract
foresaw a price for Ukraine of $450 per 1,000 cubic
meters, which was comparable to how much the EU
countries paid. However, Ukraine, with its obsolete
and inefficient gas transit network and retail gas price
subsidies, simply could not afford to pay such high
prices to Gazprom. Therefore, the country continued accumulating debt and gave Russia a new lever
in their uneven relationship. During the Yanukovich
rule and even beyond, the greed of the oligarchs who
controlled gas purchase and distribution has prevented serious reforms from taking place. Brussels and
Berlin, Germany, have not prioritized the reduction of
their own Russian gas consumption and would not—
or could not—force Kyiv to cut its dependence on this
energy source either.
The 2014 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine
began in late-2013 against the background of the popular uprising against the Yanukovich rule, supported
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by the oligarchs. Putin went out of his way to convince Yanukovich not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, which the Ukrainian leader had
earlier promised to sign. Moscow also did its best to
pave the way for Yanukovich to bring Ukraine into
the Russian-led Eurasian Union.
On December 17, 2013, Putin and Yanukovich
reached a deal, according to which Russia would provide Ukraine a loan of $15 billion and would offer
the country a discount on Russian gas.66 The meeting
between the two presidents took place after the “unexpected” decision by Yanukovich to postpone the
integration of Ukraine with the EU and not to sign the
Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU
at the Vilnius Summit in late-November 2013. After
this decision led to outrage among pro-Western Ukrainians, who most likely looked to the EU integration as
a way to overcome their Soviet past once and for all,
Russia tried to soothe the anger by offering Ukraine
something the EU could not give Kyiv—easy money
and cheap gas.
In December 2013, Gazprom and Naftogaz signed
amendments to the 2009 gas contract, where the price
of the Russian gas for Ukraine would fall from around
$400 per 1,000 cubic meters to $268.5. This step was
meant to be a “temporary” solution. A final solution
on the price and on the way of ensuring the security
of transit of the Russian gas to the EU was to be found
later. The high price of $400 per 1,000 cubic meters
had been dreaded by Ukraine and was one of the excuses to jail Timoshenko, who signed the original 2009
contract with Putin on behalf of Ukraine. In exchange
for Russia lowering the price by almost 33 percent,
Ukraine officially did not have to make any conces-
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sions. However, the subsequent actions of the Ukrainian government, led by Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov, suggested that Yanukovich’s promise to merely
“postpone” the European integration process instead
of openly reversing it was only an attempt to appease
the public, calm down the protesters, and buy time.
Although it was never publically announced, there
are reasons to believe that, in exchange for cheaper
gas, Yanukovich agreed to forego the original Ukrainian plans to sign the Association Agreement with
the EU.67
A turning point came when Yanukovich was ousted by the EuroMaidan protesters in February 2014.
With Yanukovich gone, Russia lost an incentive to
subsidize Kyiv’s loyalty to the Kremlin with cheap
gas. In March 2014, Gazprom started making warning
comments that the gas discount might be abolished.
The warnings materialized on April 1, 2014, when
Gazprom announced that it increased the gas price for
Ukraine to $385.5 per 1,000 cubic meters.68 This was a
$117 (or 43.5 percent) increase compared to the 2013
price of $268.50 agreed to by Putin and Yanukovich.
The official reason for the price increase was the high
debt of Naftogaz to Gazprom. As of early-April 2014,
the debt Naftogaz owed to Gazprom was estimated to
amount to more than $2.2 billion.69
In early-March 2014, Naftogaz announced that it
had paid for the Russian gas received in January and
promised to pay for the gas received in February in
due course.70 By April 7, 2014, Ukraine was supposed
to pay its gas debt of $2.2 billion, which Naftogaz
failed to do.71 The easiest short-term solution would
have been for Russia to provide Ukraine with a loan of
$2 to $3 billion. However, this was out of the question
because Russia did not recognize the then-leadership
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of Ukraine (between February and May 2014) as legitimate. Moscow claimed that Prime Minister Arseniy
Yatsenyuk and The Verkhovna Rada Speaker Arsen
Avakov did not assume power in Kyiv based on any
legitimate expression of will of the Ukrainian nation.
Trilateral gas talks between the EU, Ukraine, and Russia during the period from April to mid-June 2014
turned out to be fruitless. Russia agreed to lower the
initially proposed price for Ukraine to $385 per 1,000
cubic meters by adjusting its federal gas export tariffs,
but Ukraine insisted on a price of $320. The gas talks
were excruciating. In May 2014, Ukraine and Europe
feared that, if Ukraine did not pay its debt as demanded by Gazprom, Russia might turn off gas on June 3.
On May 1, 2014, the retail gas prices for the Ukrainian consumers increased by around 50 percent.72 The
lowest tariff for households rose to $95.5 for 1,000 cubic meters of gas, which is still well below the wholesale prices Ukraine pays Russia, as the retail gas prices
for households is heavily subsidized. The maximum
retail gas price that gas distribution companies were
allowed to charge increased to $414.02 at the then exchange rate, excluding the value-added tax (VAT) and
other taxes. On April 1, 2015, the retail prices of natural gas for households went up again by another 285
percent on average.73 Wholesale gas prices for industrial consumers went up also, although not as sharply.
Higher natural gas prices also increased the Ukrainian
consumers’ bills for electricity and hot water. These
price increases were not final. Raising the price of electricity and the phasing out of electricity subsidies are
divided into five stages, with the last one ending in
March 2017. Another round of talks between Russia,
Ukraine, and the EU took place on May 26, 2014.
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The payment schedule that emerged as a result of
the talks was that Naftogaz would pay Gazprom part
of its gas debt. By May 29, 2014, Naftogaz was expected
to pay $2 billion and an additional $500 million by June
7, 2014. Gazprom warned Naftogas that, if Ukraine did
not pay the June gas bill in advance by 10:00 AM on
June 3, Gazprom would cut off gas to the country. On
May 30, Ukraine announced that it had sent a payment
to Gazprom covering part of the gas debt.74 However,
Naftogaz paid only $786 million, instead of the $1.45
billion demanded by Gazrom. Gazprom then initially postponed the deadline to June 9. This deadline
was again postponed to June 10 and subsequently to
June 16.75
On June 16, 2014, Gazprom introduced a regime
of advance payments for gas in its transactions with
Ukraine.76 In addition to that, Gazprom cut gas supplies for Ukrainian consumers and started shipping
only the gas intended for transit to Europe via the
Ukrainian gas network. However, Ukraine felt relatively confident about its own gas supply situation,
because it had accumulated 15-bcm of gas in its underground reservoirs, which was estimated to be enough
until October 2014. On October 2, 2014, the Russian
Cabinet of Ministers adopted a decision which allowed Gazprom to subtract a sum owed to it by a foreign partner from potential payments Gazprom had
to pay to that contractor for gas transit.77 In particular,
this decision applied to Naftogaz. The Russian decision allowed Gazprom not to pay Naftogaz for gas
transit to the EU and to lower the debt of Naftogaz by
the sum of the required transit payments.
In early-October 2014, Yatsenyuk stated that
Ukraine was considering two potential options for
its next steps in the gas issue.78 The first one was to
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try to reach a deal on an acceptable price with Russia, together with EU backing. If this strategy did
not work, Ukraine planned to demand an interim
court decision, which would set the price and other
conditions of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine until
a final verdict was reached by the Stockholm arbitration court. On October 14, 2014, Naftogaz filed a suit
against Gazprom in order to claim compensation for
the allegedly insufficient transit volumes, which led to
lower transit revenues for Naftogaz than anticipated.79
Naftogaz demanded in court to either amend or cancel those provisions of its contract with Gazprom that
were not being implemented by the latter. In particular, Naftogaz also demanded to change the system of
the calculation of transit tariffs paid by Gazprom to
Naftogaz, according to European norms.
According to Naftogaz, the minimum volume of
transited gas agreed upon in the contract was 110bcm per year. However, in 2012, the amount of transshipped gas was only 83-bcm, and in 2013, the amount
was 86-bcm. Naftogaz proposed to follow the decision
of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers on the temporary method of transit tariff calculation adopted in
compliance with the EU Directive No. 2009/73/EC on
September 3, 2014. The document introduced separate
tariffs for separate routes of the Russian gas in the
Ukrainian gas grid in the form of both cash payments
and extra free gas supplies.80 Naftogaz also proposed
to adopt a new enhanced method as a basis for the
calculation from the beginning of 2015.
On October 31, 2014, Russia, Ukraine, and the EU
reached a deal on Russian gas supplies to Ukraine for
the period until the end of March 2015.81 It took the
parties seven rounds of talks and 5 months of negotiations to reach the deal.82 Kyiv agreed to the price
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of $385 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas, which was the
price for winter gas supplies originally proposed by
Kyiv in August 2014. Ukraine also agreed to pay for
the gas deliveries in advance. In turn, Russia provided
Ukraine with a $100 discount per 1,000 cubic meters
by cutting Russia’s gas export tariffs. The deal provided a discount for Ukraine in exchange for paying off
$5.3 billion of its overall gas debt to Gazprom. Russia
also agreed not to implement Gazprom’s traditional
take-or-pay principle banned by EU. Nevertheless,
due to Ukraine’s financial crisis and cash shortages,
the source of financial resources for Ukraine to pay
further advance payments was not clear.
This deal seems to have been in the best interest of
all three parties. Russia received at least some money
from Ukraine, while Ukraine got the gas from Russia it
badly needed. The EU, which worried mostly about a
potential escalation of the gas conflict between Russia
and Ukraine and subsequent disruptions of Russian
gas supplies to the EU, got a guarantee of relatively
safe gas deliveries, at least for the time being. The EU
ended up playing a less important role in the deal than
both Russia and Ukraine demanded. Initially, Ukraine
requested that the EU keep an eye on the pricing,
while Russia demanded that Brussels guarantee advance payments by Ukraine for the Russian gas. The
EU accepted neither of these requests, but limited its
role to an unspecified “contribution” to the deal itself.
Germany’s Angela Merkel and France’s Francois
Holland have said that the EU would, together with
the United States and the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and the United States), do
everything it could to facilitate the implementation
of the deal.83 The EU has been keeping that promise.
In addition to the overall financial support of 1.61 bil-
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lion Euros approved in 2010 and later in April 2014,84
Brussels approved one more package of aid for Kyiv
for 1.82 billion Euros in late March 2015.85 As part of
this approved package, the EU gave Ukraine a low
interest rate loan of 250 million Euros in April 2015,
aimed at stabilizing the Ukrainian economy and creating conditions for sustainable growth.86 However, this
assistance is unlikely to stave off Ukraine’s default on
the debt.
According to the October 2014 deal, Naftogaz was
expected to pay $1.45 billion of its gas debt immediately after the end of the talks, while, by the end of
2014, it should have paid Gazprom an additional $1.65
billion. Thus, the overall debt repayment was agreed
to reach $3.1 billion by the end of 2014. Naftogaz fulfilled its commitments. It paid Gazprom the first $1.45
billion on November 4, 2014, and the remaining $1.65
billion in late-December 2014.87 The overall size of the
debt of $3.1 billion to be paid to Gazprom was based
on the price of $268 per 1,000 cubic meters. On November 5, 2014, Ukraine also paid its first advance installment to Russia for $1.5 billion in order to ensure
Russian gas supplies for the coming winter.
On November 10, 2014, Naftogaz accused Gazprom of failing to compensate Naftogaz for the gas
transit for September and October. In principle, Gazprom was ready to pay for the transit, but wanted to
calculate the transit price based on the price of $485
per 1,000 cubic meters for Ukraine, whereas Ukraine
wanted Gazprom to pay for the transit based on the
price of $268. At first sight, the willingness of Gazprom to pay more than Naftogaz is ready to accept
may seem counterintuitive. However, the reason for
that is that both parties expect to use the final base
price for the transit as an additional argument at the
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Stockholm arbitration court. Thus, according to Naftogaz, for September Gazprom was supposed to pay
$64 million and for October another $88 million. Back
in August 2014, Gazprom paid Naftogaz $10.54 million for transit because the original June 2013 advance
payment for transit of $1 billion had run out. Gazprom
argued that the original advance payment was based
on the price of $400 per 1,000 cubic meters, while in
the meantime Gazprom increased the price to $485.
Naftogaz insisted that the transit payments should
be calculated based on the price of $286 and returned
the payment to Gazprom. From April to October 2014,
Gazprom wanted to pay $360 million for transit while
Naftogaz was willing to accept only $190 million.
On December 6, 2014, Naftogaz paid Gazprom
$378 million for the 1-bcm of gas Naftogaz expected to
receive in December.88 On December 8, Gazprom announced that it would restore gas supplies to Ukraine
on December 11.89 Nevertheless, Gazprom renewed its
gas supplies to Ukraine 2 days earlier, on December
9.90 The announced daily volume of the gas supplies
to Ukraine was 43.5-mcm.
Ukraine’s GDP is several times as energy intensive
as the GDPs of advanced Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development economies on average.91 Moreover, Ukraine is the most energy intensive country in the world.92 Energy loss in Ukraine’s
heating systems is estimated to be around 65 percent,
which is several times above the levels in advanced
economies. This issue also contributes to the fact that
the increase in Ukraine’s gas prices to $485.50 would
have devastating effects for a range of heavy industries, such as metallurgy, vehicle manufacturing, and
chemical industry, and may lead to their halt.
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The 2014 gas dispute between the two countries
has had several parallel conflicts within it. We will examine those one by one. The first conflict was the price
dispute. Russia’s interest is to have the price as high as
possible, while Ukraine’s interest is to have it as low
as possible. While Russia lost its incentive to lower the
gas price for Ukraine in exchange for the latter’s economic integration with the Eurasian Union, Ukraine
kept insisting on a price substantially lower than what
Gazprom was willing to offer.
The second dispute was about the gas transit price.
Here, Russia was interested in paying more, while
Ukraine insisted that Russia pay less. This logic, counterintuitive at first sight, is connected to the way of
calculating the transit price, which is based on the
price of gas for Naftogaz.
The third line conflict was a version of the takeor-pay principle, which in this case, relates to the
amount of Russian gas transferred through Ukraine.
The transfer contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz
foresees a minimum amount of gas (110-bcm per year).
Gazprom has to ship that amount to Europe through
Ukraine or, if the transferred amount of gas is lower,
reimburse Naftogaz for the difference. However, after the Nord Stream came online in 2011, Ukraine’s
significance as a transit country has declined. Moreover, Gazprom has expressed plans to bypass Ukraine
completely in its gas deliveries to Europe starting in
2019.93 This may lead to additional tensions regarding
this minimum contract requirement for gas transfer
through Ukraine.
The fourth conflict was about the unpaid debt of
Naftogaz to Gazprom. Naftogaz blackmailed Gazprom by not paying its bills. Gazprom had a choice
between the bad and the worse—between turning a
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blind eye on the debt of Naftogaz or cutting gas supplies to Naftogaz and, at the same time, cutting the
supply to the EU. In this dispute, the EU served as
Ukraine’s hostage, with little formal influence on either of the parties in the dispute. Due to the fighting
and the high complexity of gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine, especially their 2014-15 iteration, it
seems unlikely that Russian piped gas would become
a predictable and reliable source of energy for Europe in the long run. The EU needs to do its best to
diversify its sources of natural gas, and minimize the
threat of becoming a hostage of a dispute it can barely
influence.
Interconnectors for European Gas Transit.
The Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that Europe is
in a desperate need to improve security of its gas supply. This can be done through optimizing the natural
gas pipelines on the continent and building interconnectors based on strategic demand. Since the 2009 crisis, there has been progress in connecting the Central
European countries with gas pipelines that are able
to transport gas in both directions. The Central European region, which depends the most on Russian gas,
currently lacks a coherent north-south gas pipeline
connection, which would run from Poland to Slovakia, Hungary, and Croatia. Such a connection would
ensure flexibility of a bidirectional gas flow in case of
need. This north-south route would connect the LNG
terminals in Poland and Croatia. The Central European countries have made this project one of their priorities, and they plan to seek EU funds for its construction, which increases the likelihood of success.
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In the meantime, in November 2014, Croatia renewed the project of construction of an LNG terminal
on its island of Krk, which had been on the drawing
board for around a decade.94 The terminal should cost
around 600 million Euros and have a capacity of 4 to
6-bcm of gas per year. If built, this LNG terminal will
be useful not only for Croatia, which produces around
60 percent of its gas needs domestically, but will also
contribute to the energy security of Central Europe after the north-south route is constructed and launched.
The 2009 gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine
incentivized Slovakia to ensure its ability to receive
gas from Austria and the Czech Republic in case of a
similar emergency. Slovakia and the Czech Republic
made necessary improvements to the already existing
pipeline interconnector between the two countries,
which made it possible to supply gas from the Czech
Republic to Slovakia. The reversible interconnector is
capable of transporting up to 67-mcm/day of gas to
Slovakia (24.5-bcm per year). Similarly, Slovakia built
a small interconnector with Austria, which is capable
of transporting up to 23-mcm/day of gas (8.4-bcm per
year).95 Croatia and Hungary built the Városföld–Slobodnica pipeline, which became operational in August 2011.96 The pipeline can transport up to 7-bcm
per year.
Initially, gas companies resisted such interconnectors, because they meant more choice for consumers
and thus lower prices.97 The impetus for building the
interconnectors was the Third Energy Package of the
EU, and the growing concerns in the region about the
reliability of Russia as a gas supplier. Thus, Poland
has been connected with the Czech Republic since
2011. Slovakia is constructing an interconnector with
Poland and Hungary. Germany has been intercon-
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nected with Italy, Poland, and the Czech Republic.
The countries that are still critically lacking similar gas
interconnectors are the Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania—which continue to depend on Russia
for their gas supplies.
In late-March 2014, Slovakia and Hungary opened
a gas interconnector between the two countries near
the Hungarian village of Szada.98 This was an important moment mainly for Hungary, because the interconnector gives Hungary a possibility to receive nonRussian piped gas for the first time in its history. The
pipeline cost 170 million Euros, out of which Slovakia
paid around 21 million Euros, and was expected to be
launched in a test mode on January 1, 2015.99 However, it did not become operational as planned because
of technical problems on the Hungarian side, and
the launch of the test phase was initially postponed
to February 2015.100 At the time of this writing (June
2015), the test phase was underway and was planned
to be finished by the end of June 2015. The pipeline
was planned to be launched commercially on July 1,
2015.101
In late-October 2014, the Slovak wholesale gas
operator Eustream submitted its first project, the construction of a gas interconnector with Poland.102 Construction of this interconnector will make it possible
for Slovakia to import LNG from the Polish LNG terminal of Świnoujście, located on the coast of the Baltic
Sea. The interconnector itself should be around 170km long and should run from the Polish gas hub in
Strachocina (located in the southeastern tip of Poland)
to the Slovak gas hub in Veľké Kapušany (located
near the Slovak-Ukrainian border). The construction
of the interconnector is planned for the years of 2018
and 2019, and the pipeline should be launched in
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2020. However, even if these interconnectors were up
and running, there is still the issue of where the gas
would come from to fill these pipelines. It might actually come from Russia, including through the already
operational Nord Stream, as the new EU legislation
forbids destination clauses and thus denies Gazprom
the ability to discriminate between client countries
and companies.
It is unclear whether there is a potential Southern
route for the Russian gas after the demise of the South
Stream Project. Russia would aspire now to supply
Europe via the Turkish Stream project. Bypassing
Ukraine would solve one challenge, the problem of
Ukraine as a transit country, but would not solve the
other problem—the unreliability of Russia as a predictable and transparent gas supplier that plays by
EU current and future rules.
Wealth Transfer to Russia and Military
Budget Funding.
Oil and gas revenue play a key role in Russian
military modernization in general, and in the Ukrainian hostilities in particular. Military operations in
the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine/Donbass suggest a
higher level of operational competence, modernized
weapons systems, better training, a more efficient
supply chain, as well as better paid contract personnel and officer corps. This costs money, which comes
from energy exports to Europe and elsewhere. Thus,
the EU consumers of Russian oil and gas indirectly
help finance this long-term and dangerous Russian
military modernization, aggression, and annexation.
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Russia continues to suffer from low competitiveness of its industrial base and the services sector,
which leaves the country exporting mainly natural
resources—oil and gas, other raw materials, and semifinished goods are the top currency earners. Russian
exports also include weapons and nuclear reactors,
relatively sophisticated items. Revenues from these
exports make a significant share of Russia’s federal
budget, which makes Russia particularly dependent
on energy export revenues. The overall share of revenues from hydrocarbon exports in the Russian federal
budget was just above 50 percent in 2013.103 In 2014,
the number is expected to be 52 percent.
According to the Russian federal budget forecasts,
the share of hydrocarbon revenues are expected to
reach 7.7 trillion rubles (around $160 billion according to the November 2014 exchange rate) in 2015, and
rise to 8 trillion rubles in 2016, and to 8.2 billion in
2017.104 The Russian federal budget is expected to receive 51 percent of its revenues from hydrocarbons in
2015, 50.8 percent in 2016, and 49.6 percent in 2017.105
This revenue is being used to finance the modernization of the Russian military. According to the Russian
state program on modernization of the Russian armed
forces in 2011–20, the federal government initially
planned to spend around 19.6 trillion rubles106 (at the
time, around $700 billion) on modernizing all branches of the Russian military—its strategic nuclear forces,
submarines, fleet, air force, and army.
Despite a series of lingering problems in the Russian military, such as poor morale of the conscripts,
widespread harassment, and poor health of the soldiers, these investments are already making a difference in the overall strength of the Russian armed
forces. Although this modernization of the Russian
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military is unlikely to pose a direct threat to the U.S.
power projection beyond the Russian periphery, it
has led to an increasingly assertive behavior of the
Kremlin in the former Soviet Union countries, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
members, the Baltics, and across Western Europe and
the Arctic. The crisis in Ukraine, including the Russian
annexation of Crimea and the Russian-instigated, supported, and prosecuted war of secession in the Crimea
and Eastern Ukraine, demonstrate this new assertiveness. Therefore, it is in U.S. and European interests to
find ways of curbing the volume of the hydrocarbon
revenues of the Russian federal budget in order to
constrain the financing of the military modernization
program and the neo-imperialist aspirations.
Politically, the “guns or butter” choice is sensitive: As the Putin political regime is reliant on the
so called byudzhetniki—people supported by federal
budget transfers, such as the military, police, pensioners, teachers, and the vast, state-sector medical
personnel—U.S. policymakers hoped the Kremlin
might cut military expenses rather than curb social
transfers. Russia has to be encouraged to face the unpalatable choice: gun or butter. So far, however, the
choice Moscow has made was in favor of guns—with
popular support. Alternatively, as they say in Russia,
in the battle between the TV set and the refrigerator,
the victory is that of the TV set.
Europe’s Reluctance to Sanction the Russian
Energy Sector.
Although European imports of Russian gas earn
Russia around $100 million per day, the EU has not
used this Russian dependence on European gas mon-
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ey as leverage in the current crisis in Ukraine. The
EU sanctions towards Russia did not touch Russian
energy exports, although financing and technology
transfer to state-owned energy companies are the target of sanctions. The reason for this is the asymmetric
mutual dependence of the EU and Russia regarding
Russia’s gas exports to Europe.
While the EU can exist without Russian gas only
for several months, Russia can easily function without
the income for the gas paid by the EU for at least 1
year, possibly 2. If the EU decided to sanction Russia’s
gas exports to Europe, it would hurt itself significantly more than it would hurt Russia in the short term.
However, while the EU can find alternative sources of
gas and reduce dependence on Russia, Moscow would
have a very hard time replacing the vast European
gas market for its West Siberian and Arctic supplies.
Understanding this dynamic, the EU sanctioned the
Russian energy industry, indirectly, through bans on
acquiring sophisticated EU drilling technology and access to finance. Those European politicians, who realize the Russian threat to the continent’s security, hope
that the Kremlin would be responsive to its economic
pressure and moderate their policy, or members of the
EU would find alternatives to Russian gas. So far, the
Russian leadership has indicated that the Novorossiya
(Russian pseudo-historic name for Eastern and South
Ukraine) may be winding down. However, there is
scant evidence Russia has changed its policy based on
economic pressure alone. More research is necessary
to establish the relationship of economic, military, and
internal/political factors in the Russian policymaking
on the Ukraine conflict.
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Price Formation for Different European Consumers
as a Function of Their Dependence
on Russian Gas.
One of the characteristic features of Russia as an
energy supplier is the continuing use of the gas sales
as a political lever. As noted earlier, Russia uses its
gas monopoly power in parts of Europe in two ways:
economic and political. The economic side is understandable—maximizing profits. However, Russia also
often chooses to “reward” and “punish” its neighboring countries by setting a price that does not necessarily lead to the highest economic profits of Gazprom,
but instead aims at reaching the political goals of the
Kremlin in the respective countries. Thus, more Kremlin-friendly regimes, including those in Eastern and
Central Europe, are rewarded with discounted gas
prices, while those that want to distance themselves
from Moscow pay as much as they can bear. The most
notable example on the lower end is Belarus, which
pays around $160 per 1,000 cubic meters. On the other
side are the Baltic States, namely Estonia and Lithuania, which pay the highest wholesale gas prices in
the EU (31.29 and 36.73 Euros per MWh respectively,
which approximately corresponds to 330 Euros per
1,000 cubic meters in the case of Estonia and 390 Euros
in the case of Lithuania),107 negatively impacting the
international competitiveness of these countries.
Moscow’s “Eastern Export Policy” to China
and Its Limitations.
Russia is not just passively watching Europe trying
to eliminate its role in supplying Europe with gas. It is
actively looking for new markets. One of the few pos-
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sibilities it seems to have is China. Russia has adopted a so-called “Eastern Export Policy.” In May 2014,
Russia and China signed a deal which will bring gas
from Eastern Siberia to China, supposedly by 2024,
which was dubbed the “deal of the century.”108 Under
the deal, Russia will supply 38-bcm of gas to China
annually through the Power of Siberia pipeline. According to unofficial sources, the agreed price is about
$350 per 1,000 cubic meters, which was less that the
EU countries were paying at the time. In addition,
Russia will bear the costs of developing the fields and
building the pipelines to the Chinese border, and the
price for the gas for the 30-year contract period will be
fixed. While many details of the deal are secret, many
experts suggested that this policy would not lead to
an increase of Gazprom’s profits. Instead, it is viewed
more as a kind of market diversification and an insurance against European attempts to shatter the Russian
gas yoke. Nevertheless, the diversification will not
happen until the beginning of the next decade due to
the need to develop the gas fields that Russia is planning to use as a source of the gas pipelined to China.
Russia and China are now considering adding the
Western export route capacity to 100-mcm per annum
(the Altay pipeline from Western Siberia). However,
the China market does not seem to be a lucrative alternative to European consumers due to the lower
premiums Gazprom will be able to charge. Increasing
the share of gas in its energy mix would undoubtedly
benefit China, which now uses mostly coal for its industries, heavily polluting its environment. In addition, China revised its potential for shale gas production downwards,109 which will most likely give Beijing
additional incentives to be more willing to strike a gas
deal with Russia. Pipelined gas would most likely be
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cheaper than the LNG Asia imported until late-2014
for significantly higher prices than the rest of the
world. However, one of the key aspects of the Altay
pipeline—the price—is not yet agreed upon, and, in
view of the natural gas price collapse, is likely to continue to be negotiated between Moscow and Beijing.
In addition, Kazakhstan came up with an initiative to build a pipeline from Russia’s Western Siberia to China through its territory.110 If built, this new
route could become an alternative to the Altay pipeline, which was a target of objections from the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Alexander Sobyanin, Head of the Strategic
Planning Service of the Association of Trans-border
Cooperation, said that Kazakhstan is a natural route
for such a pipeline from Western Siberia. Russia and
Kazakhstan are de facto allies as members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), CIS, and Collective
Security Treaty Organization.
In the 1990s, Kazakhstan pursued a multivector
foreign policy, which caused a certain degree of suspicion from Moscow. That has changed, and for the
past couple of years, Kazakhstan has been firmly participating in the Moscow-dominated Customs Union
and the EEU. The challenge for Russia can be in the
fact that Kazakhstan wants its gas fields to contribute
to the pipeline as well, which means that Russia may
end up selling less gas and getting less cash for the gas
transported through the pipeline than it would if the
pipeline transferred only Russian gas. If Russia blocks
sales of Kazakhstani gas to China, Astana might decide to sell it to Europe, further weakening Europe’s
dependence on Russian gas.
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IMPACT OF THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT AND
THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE
Emergency Gas Plan Drafted by the
EU Commission.
Russian gas dependence may threaten Europe if
Moscow decides to temporarily or permanently cut
the supply to its customers. The EU temporarily could
pursue several policies in case a shortage of Russian
gas develops.111 Limitations on consumption can only
go so far and have a high economic cost. For instance,
EU could ban gas exports beyond its borders and limit
the amount of gas intended for industrial use as part
of emergency measures to protect household energy
supplies in the winter months.
One of the measures may thus be banning a socalled reselling of imported gas to third countries. In
2010, the EU passed a regulation (994/2010) adopted
after the 2009 gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine
that protects European gas supplies.112 The regulation
obliges the EU member states to establish a Preventive Action Plan and an Emergency Plan. The Preventive Action Plan contains the identified risks of each
member state’s gas supply and proposed measures
to mitigate those risks. While such measures would
inevitably hurt the European economy, they would
make sure that households do not freeze in the winter
months. Second, as large enterprises do not have supply priority, these would get disconnected in order to
make enough gas available for households.
The Emergency Plan contains the measures aimed
at mitigating the impact of a disruption in supply after it occurs. The regulation also provides for deadlines and rules of building reversible, bidirectional
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interconnectors between the member states, which is
being done at the time of this writing. It also defines
households as “protected customers” and obliges the
member states to ensure gas supplies to these customers as a priority in case of gas supply disruptions. In
practice, this regulation means that it is a part of a
so-called “Plan B,” prepared by the European Commission. In addition, the EU countries have been preparing for a possible disruption by pumping more gas
into their underground reservoirs. In August 2014,
Europe had 16.52-bcm (31.2 percent) more gas in its
reservoirs compared to the same month of 2013.
In August 2014, both Ukraine and Russia added
tension to the issue of the security of the Russian gas
supply for the near term. In late August, Ukrainian
Prime Minister Yatsenyuk said he knew about Russian plans to cut off gas to the EU during the 2014-15
winter.113 Alexander Novak, Russia’s energy minister, who called Yatsenyuk’s comment a “groundless
attempt to intentionally mislead or misinform European consumers of Russian gas,” promptly denied
these claims. As further developments demonstrated,
Russia has not stopped the flow of gas.
Problems of the Reverse Flow of Gas
from the EU to Ukraine.
In the summer of 2014, Ukraine was unwilling to
bow to Russian demands to pay billions of U.S. dollars for gas it owed to Gazprom, and Moscow clearly warned Kyiv that it would cut off its supplies to
Ukraine in case it does not pay back its debt. To find
a way out, Ukraine approached the EU with the proposal to organize “reverse” gas flows from the EU
to Ukraine. The reverse flow of gas would use the
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existing pipelines, while the direction of the gas flow
would be reversed: Russian gas would flow from the
EU to Ukraine. Three EU countries bordering Ukraine
became the main partners of Ukraine in this project—
Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. All three of them successfully organized the reverse flow, but in none of
these three countries was the reverse flow without
issues.
Poland.
Poland is capable of generating a reverse gas flow
to Ukraine of up to four million cubic meters per day.
However, on September 10, 2014, Poland stopped
supplying gas to Ukraine. The reason was that Russia
lowered its own supplies of gas to Poland through Belarus and Ukraine, which in turn forced the Polish gas
operator, Polish Petroleum and Gas Mining (PGNiG),
to cut off its exports of gas to Ukraine. The decrease of
Russian supplies was gradual, initially going down by
20 percent and dropping to a level 45 percent below
the usual volume.114 However, 2 days later, on September 12, 2014, Poland restored the original level of
its gas supplies to Ukraine due to the fact that it found
alternative sources of gas, namely Germany and the
Czech Republic, which were able to compensate the
decrease in Russian gas supplies.
Slovakia.
Before the beginning of the reverse flow of gas
from Slovakia to Ukraine, there were two options: a
so-called “small reverse” (supplies of around 8 to 10bcm per year) or a so-called “big reverse” (supplies
of around 30-bcm per year). The “big reverse” would

56

have used one of the pipelines Gazprom uses to pump
gas to Slovakia from Ukraine. The “small reverse”
was expected to take advantage of an unused small
pipeline between the Slovak Village of Vojany on the
Slovak-Ukraine border and the Ukrainian town of
Uzhhorod on the other side of the border.
Initially, Ukraine pushed for the “big reverse,”
which would be able to supply the country with much
more gas, while Slovakia wanted the “small reverse.”115
The option considered for the “big reverse” was a socalled virtual reverse flow of gas, which would mean
that the Russian gas intended for Slovakia physically
would remain in Ukraine, but Slovakia would pay
Gazprom as if the gas was delivered physically to the
Slovak gas network. The Slovak government refused
this idea, because, according to the legal opinion it
received, Slovakia might breach its agreements with
Gazprom. According to the contract, the gas was Gazprom’s property until it crossed the Slovak-Ukrainian border. In addition to that, this option would be
technically difficult to implement. Therefore, Slovakia
insisted on the “small reverse.”
However, in order to make the “small reverse” flow
realizable, a special measuring facility had to be constructed in the village of Vojany. Disputes over who
would pay for the construction of the facility emerged.
The Ukrainian side demanded the Slovak government
build and finance the facility entirely. Slovakia agreed
to finance the construction of the necessary facility in
Vojany in full, which cost around 20 million Euros.
The Slovak government agreed to build the measuring facility, even though there were no guarantees
that they would ever profit from this investment.
Brussels refused to guarantee to compensate the Slovak government in case of losses.116 Nevertheless, on
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April 28, 2014, the Ukrainian and the Slovak governments signed a memorandum.117 Despite the required
investment to build the necessary infrastructure in the
eastern part of the country on its own, the reverse flow
of gas from Slovakia to Ukraine is also in the Slovak
economic interest, as the gas suppliers now are paid
for the reverse transit, which is expected to compensate the Slovak suppliers for their initial investment
into the infrastructure.
Initially, Gazprom tried to prevent the reverse
flow of gas from Slovakia to Ukraine from happening.
Gazprom’s CEO Alexey Miller said that those countries which agreed to supply Ukraine with the reverse
flow of gas, would face lower supplies from Russia.
Although it indeed happened later, allegedly for technical reasons, this threat did not prevent Slovakia and
its neighbors from going ahead with the reverse flow.
The real reasons for the temporary decrease of Russian gas supplies to Slovakia, as well as to Poland,
are not fully known. It might have been an attempt
of Gazprom to exploit the potential sense of vulnerability in Slovakia and Poland to gas cut-offs. It might
have been a warning signal to Europe that Gazprom
indeed was prepared to use the mutual “asymmetric” gas dependency of Europe and Russia to its own
advantage,118 but chose not to do so.
On September 2, 2014, the Slovak gas operator Eustream started supplying Ukraine with gas through
the Vojany–Uzhhorod pipeline.119 According to Yatsenyuk, the reverse flow of gas from Slovakia should
compensate around 40 percent of the gas Ukraine
used to get from Russia. According to the deal between the Slovak and the Ukrainian governments,
Slovakia committed to supply Ukraine with gas until
2019.120 On September 10, 2014, Slovak gas distributor
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Slovensky Plynarensky Priemysel (SPP) announced
a decrease in the volume of gas supplies to Slovakia
from Russia through Ukraine by 10 percent. However,
this disruption was only temporary. It did not cause
much tension and did not influence the reverse gas
flow to Ukraine. Initially, the agreed volume of the
reverse flow of gas from Slovakia to Ukraine was 27mcm per day (10-bcm per year).121 However, by March
2015, this volume was increased to 40-mcm per day
(14.6-bcm per year), which is the largest volume of gas
supplied to Ukraine from the West.122
Hungary.
Initially, Hungary was among the three countries
that allowed the reversed flow of natural gas from
the EU to Ukraine. On April 8, 2014, Hungary stated
that, in the event excess supplies were available, it
was ready to ship up to 6-bcm of gas to Ukraine per
year. The maximum capacity of the pipeline through
which the reverse flow was to be implemented determined this limitation. However, the reverse gas flow
from Hungary did not last for long. In July 2014, Hungary lowered the amounts it was pumping to Ukraine
within the reverse flow of gas due to its need to fill
its own underground gas reservoirs in order to prepare for winter.123 The daily amount of gas pumped
to these reservoirs amounted to around 20-mcm per
day, compared to around 10 million per day in June.
At that time, Hungary was the least prepared for winter among the countries in the region.
On September 25, 2014, Hungarian gas operator Foldgazszallito (FGSZ) announced that it fully
stopped the reverse flow of gas from Hungary to
Ukraine.124 Although FGSZ announced that cutting off
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gas supplies from Hungary to Ukraine was necessary
due to an increased domestic gas demand, this step
was made only several days after Gazprom’s CEO
Miller visited Hungary. Therefore, Naftogaz believes
that the decision was political, instead of technical.125
EUROPE’S ALTERNATIVES TO RUSSIAN GAS
AND THEIR ISSUES
Shale Gas and the Issues Associated with It.
General Shale Gas Considerations in the EU and Fear of
Hydraulic Fracturing.
The main problems for the EU when it comes to
developing its own shale gas resources are the lack
of natural resources legislation which would provide
ownership of the mineral rights to land owners who
lease the land to hydrocarbon exploration and production companies. In addition, Europe has higher
population density, which results in heightened environmental sensitivity and limitations in comparison
with the United States. Furthermore, it suffers from
the lack of public understanding of and education
about shale gas production and hydraulic fracturing
safety, from a scarcity of energy firms with proper expertise, and from a shortage of drilling equipment and
trained personnel.126 Current estimates also show that
the EU shale gas, if it is developed commercially, will
likely be more expensive than in the United States.
A major concern in the EU is the potential influence of the shale gas development on the safety and
quality of underground freshwater reservoirs. The
shale gas development is feared to result in freshwater
shortages in the areas of its development, and to cause
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freshwater, soil, and other environmental contamination and pollution. Hydraulic fracturing (fracking) is
alleged to produce aromatic compounds such as benzene and xylene, which allegedly has been the case in
Texas.127 Fracking requires large amounts of water in
order to lubricate the drilling heads, remove the drilling mud, and to create the cracks in the shale in order
for the gas to flow out. Oil and gas exploration and
production—not just fracking—reportedly caused
water contamination by methane and other substances; from spills of drilling mud, flowback, and brine;
and through either natural geological cracks or manmade pathways caused by inadequate handling, old
equipment, and inadequate cementing of the wells.
The third set of issues are those related to nonmaterial aspects: visual landscape disturbance, impact on
biodiversity, increased noise levels, and seismic concerns. While these factors are difficult to measure, they
lead to opposition towards building shale gas wells
by the locals—the NIMBY approach. In particular, a
2011 report published by the European Commission128
identifies the following risks of fracking, which is the
key part of the entire process of extracting shale gas:
consumption of landscape, air and noise pollution,
contamination of water with chemicals, earthquakes,
mobilization of radioactive particles from the underground geological strata, and the impact on biodiversity. The paper further argues that it might be more
efficient to build a solar power plant instead, because
this solar power plant would be able to generate more
electricity than the gas extracted from the same area
would be able to generate. The conclusion of this report looks dubious, as the solar-sourced electricity is
still riddled with problems of cost and intermittency
that are too numerous to address here. This may
change in the future when the technology matures.
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France: Nuclear Lobby Opposes Shale Gas.
In France, the shale gas faces a relatively strong
opposition from environmental organizations and
the general public opinion.129 One of the problems in
France is that the shale gas reserves are located close
to the populated areas.130 There were mass protests all
across France to prohibit fracking after it became clear
that the French government gave its consent for fracking to energy companies. This was a failure of public
education, which responsible governments as well as
energy companies need to undertake when dealing
with disruptive technologies.
On May 11, 2011, the French parliament voted for
a ban on producing shale gas in France. The ban entered into force on July 1, 2011, and included fracking for research purposes. However, this law does
not prohibit the production of shale gas itself. It only
prohibits fracking operations. Since fracking is the key
component of shale gas production, this ban de facto
prevents shale gas extraction. On October 23, 2011,
France revoked the license for Total, which had been
granted the right to explore the area of Montelimar
(southern France) with an area of 4,327 square km.131
Clearly, shale gas production would endanger the
already-embattled French nuclear power industry. It
is not clear in what way the powerful nuclear lobby
has intervened to stop fracking, yet conversations
with French experts and lobbyists have suggested that
this is likely the case.
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Poland: Shale Mismanagement.
Initially, Poland went through euphoria when reports appeared that there are shale gas reserves in its
territory, which would significantly reduce the country’s dependence on Russian gas.132 In 2011, the U.S.
Energy Information Administration estimated the volume of recoverable Polish shale gas at 5.3 trillion cubic
meters (tcm), which would be enough to satisfy the
domestic Polish consumption for around 300 years,
given the then consumption rate of gas in Poland.
However, according to a more conservative estimate
of the Polish Geological Institute, the amount of shale
gas in the Baltic-Podlasie-Lublin Basin is estimated to
be only between 346.1 and 767.9-bcm.133 This euphoria was later cooled down due to two reasons: geology
and politics. First, the geology of the shale gas areas
turned out to be more difficult than previously anticipated. Second, the Polish government mismanaged
the exploration and production process for shale. Foreign energy companies considered the government’s
demands for control over the revenues, exploration,
and production excessive.134 The Polish government
granted exploration licenses with too short of a term
to allow for profitable development of shale gas fields.
The government also proposed a 40 percent tax on
the profits of Polish shale gas operators and producers. This complex geology and overly tight regulatory
framework of the Polish government, plus the threat
of high taxes and lower profits for the foreign energy companies, was the main reason foreign energy
companies abandoned exploration and production of
shale gas in Poland.
The Polish government gave lesser weight to the
environmental concerns about the shale gas pro-
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duction in comparison with its Western European
counterparts. To the contrary, the Polish government
hoped that shale gas would help the country reduce
its greenhouse emissions by replacing its environmentally problematic coal-fired power plants with electric
power stations run on shale gas, especially under the
pressure from Brussels to reduce its high greenhouse
emissions. However, the exploration did not go as
planned. Companies such as ExxonMobil quit Poland
in 2012 after exploratory drilling wells produced unsatisfactory results,135 followed by Talisman and Marathon Oil exiting the country in 2013.136 On February
9, 2011, the Polish Geological Institute (PGI) reacted
to the news reports on the unprofitability of shale gas
production in Poland by simply stating that the future
probability of shale gas production could not be predicted.137 There was no economic analysis of the profitability of unconventional gas exploration. Therefore,
according to the PGI, as the geological parameters of
shale gas deposits were still unknown, it was premature to draw any conclusion about the unprofitability
of such production.
Most of the Polish public opinion supports its government’s strong desire to develop Polish shale gas
resources. According to an opinion poll conducted
in late-2011, 73 percent of Poles supported developing shale gas, while only 4 percent opposed it. One of
the main reasons behind such a strong Polish support
for shale gas seems to be the weak position of antishale gas environmentalists in Central Europe.138 This
contrasts with Western Europe, where environmental
activists were able to convince the population about
their cause. Since 2011, Poland’s ambitious desire to
develop its own shale gas fields in order to break free
from its gas dependence on Russia, combined with
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low transparency in its public sector, has involved
the country in two disputes with the EU authorities.
First, in 2013, Poland got into a dispute with the EU
about the legality of the shale gas exploration concessions granted to energy firms without a transparent
bidding process. In June 2013, the European Court of
Justice ruled that Poland violated the EU’s Hydrocarbon Directive. This decision forced Poland to amend
its laws, which in turn made the process of granting licenses more transparent and fair on one hand, but less
flexible on the other.
In June 2014, Poland got into another dispute with
the European Commission about the compliance with
the EU Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive.139 The European Commission sent a formal
notice to Warsaw that it was opening a case against it
for infringing the EIA Directive. Poland infringed the
directive by adopting a law that allowed shale gas development from fields up to 5-km below the surface.
The Poles did not require reports assessing possible
environmental impact.140
As of December 1, 2014, the Polish government
had issued 56 licenses to energy companies for shale
gas exploration, including Chevron Corporation (four
licenses), PGNiG S.A. (12 licenses), and Polski Koncern Naftowy Orlen S.A. (nine licenses).141 However,
the Polish minister of environment said that it might
take Poland several years to assess the economic viability of its shale gas reserves properly.142 The gas is
there, but its profitability remains in question. As of
now, it is unclear whether the initial Polish euphoria
about its shale gas will materialize into developing
meaningful and commercially viable amounts of gas,
which would be able to influence the Polish-Russian
gas relations materially.
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Romania: Unexplored Potential.
Romania has relatively large domestic supplies
of gas, which it used during the 2009 supply crisis to
make up for the decline in the Russian gas flow. Romania has the second highest amount of conventional
gas reserves in the EU (around 630-bcm), after the
Netherlands.143 It is the fourth largest gas producer in
the EU after the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany.
Romania might even export its gas from its Black Sea
continental shelf through Hungary to Austria by the
end of the decade.144 This would require construction
of a large east-west pipeline from Romania through
Hungary, by Hungarian national gas operator FGSZ.
According to FGSZ, the volumes of the gas supplied
by Romania would range between 1.5-bcm per year to
as much as 10-bcm per year—an optimistic expectation. The pipeline would provide better energy security for western Hungary, which is the main priority of
the pipeline, as well as diversify European gas supply.
When it comes to shale gas production, the stance
of the Romanian government over the past several
years has evolved. In 2012, the center-right government took a rather favorable position towards this issue. The left-wing opposition rejected the idea and in
May 2012, introduced a ban on any future shale gas
exploration after the left took power. In November
2014, Romanian Prime Minister Viktor Ponta said that
Romania does not have shale gas it could produce.145
This statement is baffling, as companies have not
undertaken proper exploration, and raises questions
about Ponta’s real agenda.
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Ukraine: The War Derails the Unrealized Gas Potential.
Ukraine currently produces around 20-bcm of gas
per year. After Ukraine lost Crimea in March 2014 to
Russian invasion, occupation, and annexation, no increase in production of gas is expected in Ukraine for
2014-15.146 In the first half of 2014, Ukraine produced
9.8-bcm, while the demand for gas was 24.6-bcm.
In the past, there was much optimism concerning
gas production. According to statements made by
Yanukovich in 2013, by 2020 Ukraine should become
completely independent in terms of gas, and, according to the optimistic scenario, it should become a gas
exporting country.147 The Ukrainian leadership, however, has so far failed to diversify sources of natural
gas for their country. In May 2013, the Yanukovich
presidency announced that the country should receive
the first shipment of LNG as early as the last quarter
of 2014.148 This was unrealistic, as the administration
of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Prime
Minister Yatsenyuk discovered in 2014-15. Turkey’s
resistance to shipping LNG via Bosporus killed that
project, due to safety concerns and Russian opposition
to the shipments.
Many government officials and experts in Ukraine
believe that shale gas in Ukraine is abundant, but
exploration and production has been limited so far.
Back in late-2013, local Ukrainian environmentalists
were accused of playing into the hands of Russia in
the local council of the Ivano-Frankovsk district. In
addition, the radical nationalist Svoboda (Freedom)
party organized street protests against the shale gas
production. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government
approved the shale gas contract with Chevron in late
October 2013.
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The treatment of the would-be natural gas developers by the Ukrainian government is unfavorable.
It mainly relates to the tax regime imposed by the
government on energy producing firms, both domestic and foreign. In August 2014, Yatsenyuk’s cabinet
introduced a 55 percent royalty tax on revenues of
most gas producers.149 Initially described as a temporary measure, the Ukrainian parliament made the
taxes permanent in December 2014.150 In particular,
the 55-percent royalty tax applies to gas from sources
up to 5-km below the surface, while gas drilled from
fields deeper than 5-km (and, thus, with higher production costs) is taxed 20 percent. At the time of this
writing (July 2015) a lower tax package is considered,
however, the taxation targets production volume, not
corporate profit, which is ill-advised.
Thus, while the Poroshenko administration should
be creating incentives for foreign energy firms to come
to Ukraine, explore the opportunities, and drill for
gas, the government is doing the exact opposite. The
consequences may turn out to be disastrous. Without a significant capital investment in the gas sector
in the near future, Ukraine will not only be unlikely
to achieve energy independence from Russia anytime soon, but may even deepen its dependence and
worsen its position vis-à-vis Gazprom.
Overall, more steps need to be taken to eliminate
the deep-rooted Soviet legacy in Ukraine’s public service, including endemic corruption and incompetence
of the government apparatus across the board, from
the presidential administration to regular employees
of the ministries and regional administrations. It appears far from certain whether Ukraine will be able to
react swiftly to the mounting economic crisis. Ukraine
currently needs liberalization, together with an anti-
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crisis monetary policy; and a level, stable, and predictable playing ground for both domestic and foreign investors. Without such reforms, Ukraine is unlikely to
be able to break free from its dependence on Russian
gas and from the political diktat from Moscow.151
The policy of introducing high taxes for industries
whose development is vital for the future well-being
of the country is exactly the opposite of what should
be taking place. Given the recent exodus of some
foreign experts from high public service posts,152 the
Ukrainian government ultimately is going against the
country’s national interests. In fact, some compared
Yatsenyuk’s current policies in the energy sector to
Joseph Stalin’s steps to overturn the New Economic
Policy in the early-1920s.153 Stalin’s tax and industrial policies threw the country into decades of agony,
from which it has still not recovered, even after more
than 2 decades after the fall of communism in Eastern
Europe.
Geopolitics is taking its toll as well. To increase or at
least maintain the current gas production levels prior
to the war with Russia, Ukraine has relied mostly on
the Black Sea and Azov Sea offshore areas for future
gas production.154 These are the areas now controlled
by the Russian military and populated predominantly
by pro-Russian separatists.
Some of the conventional and shale gas fields are
close to the Donetsk region—the heart of the proRussian separatist movement in eastern Ukraine. The
Crimea itself produces between 1 and 2-bcm of gas per
year, with additional off-shore fields planned to come
online between 2016 and 2020, which now may be in
doubt due to the occupation. When it comes to shale
gas, Ukraine has the third largest gas reserves in Europe, behind France and Norway, amounting to 1.2-
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tcm.155 Commercial shale gas production in Ukraine
is expected to start in 2017. Ukraine’s partners for
exploring and producing shale gas were Royal Dutch
Shell and Chevron Corporation.
The contract between Ukraine and Chevron has
never been published. That has led to speculations
about the real content of the contract. For instance,
Yury Romanyuk, deputy of the local Ivano-Frankovsk
district council, claimed that the contract contained a
series of controversial clauses. One of them allegedly
gave Chevron permission to produce any hydrocarbons it finds in the depth of up to 10-km during its
explorations of the area. The contract also allegedly
gave Chevron a right to claim water in case there was
a scarcity in a gas production area—an allegation that
has not been proven. In December 2014, Chevron
announced it was pulling out of its $10 billion shale
gas exploration project.156 The Ukrainian State Geological Service estimates the Olesska region to contain
between 0.8 and 1.5-tcm of shale gas, while the Yuzivska region is estimated to contain 2-tcm.157 The U.S.
Energy Information Administration is less optimistic
and estimates Ukraine’s total shale gas reserves at
1.2-tcm.158 In August 2014, Royal Dutch Shell froze its
shale gas exploration in Ukraine due to security concerns arising from the conflict in the eastern section
of the country.159 However, in September 2014, the
company reassured Ukraine that it would continue
developing shale gas fields in eastern Ukraine despite
the unfavorable situation due to the conflict between
Russia and Ukraine.160
Before its decision to pull out, Chevron was planning to develop a field in the Olesska area near Lviv
in western Ukraine and was ready to invest $10 billion into production of hydrocarbons in that area.161
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Even though this part of Ukraine is not engulfed in a
war, there are claims that the company is having issues with the regional government. The local population has strongly opposed the production, claiming
that the hydraulic fracturing would cause irreversible damage to the local environment. After several
closed-door meetings between the representatives of
the energy companies and the deputies of the local
councils, however, they reconsidered and supported
the drilling operations.162
According to estimates, Ukraine possesses around
5.5-tcm of shale gas, from which around 1.2-tcm should
be recoverable.163 Thanks to these reserves, Ukraine
hopes to become self-sufficient in terms of natural gas
by 2020. However, after the decision of Chevron to
cease its exploration activities in Ukraine, the drop in
gas prices, as well as the uncertain future of the development of the gas fields in the war-torn Donbass region, Ukraine’s prospects of becoming self-sufficient
in terms of gas look grimmer than ever before.
Imports from the United States.
Due to the expansion of shale gas production in
the United States, it is expected to become a net gas
exporter by 2017.164 The reasons behind this shift is not
only the boom of the U.S. shale gas industry, but also
improvements in the Mexican pipeline capacity and a
drop in the U.S. domestic demand for Canadian gas.
Central European countries are eager to diversify
their sources of gas and include the United States as
one of those sources. In March 2014, ambassadors of
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia
sent a joint letter to Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives John Boehner in which they urged his
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support in overcoming the U.S. domestic bureaucratic
hurdles preventing U.S. gas companies from exporting
LNG to the rest of the world, including Europe.165 In
response to the letter, Boehner called upon the Barack
Obama administration to approve the then pending
natural gas export requests. As of November 14, 2014,
nine approvals for LNG exports to non- Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) countries were issued.166 Although
the approvals for LNG exports to non-FTA countries
are slowly being issued, the question that remains is
the actual physical ability of the United States to contribute substantially to the global LNG market and
thus provide Europe with a realistic, albeit expensive,
alternative. Bernstein Research claims that, while the
U.S. Government approved LNG export projects for
10 billion cubic feet (bcf) per day as of May 2014, there
is only room for around 6 to 7-bcf per day of U.S. LNG
exports in the next 5 years.167 The reason for that is
the slow approval process, which delays the start of
construction of these facilities.
As of May 2015, the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) approved 10 LNG export projects,168 with most
of the export terminals in Texas and Louisiana.169
Pending DOE review are 33 other projects. The first
export terminal that received final approval from the
U.S. Government is the Cheniere Energy’s Sabine Pass
Liquefaction terminal in Cameron Parish, with a capacity of 4-bcf per day (around 41-bcm per year).170 171
It should be finished in late-2015.172 Four other export
terminals are under construction as of June 2015. Experts expect the global LNG trade to reach 450-bcm in
2019.173
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European LNG Imports from Outside
the United States.
U.S. LNG exports may benefit European energy
security. According to Gas Infrastructure Europe, the
EU gets approximately 46 percent of its annual LNG
imports from Qatar, which exported 17.23-bcm of
LNG to Europe in 2013.174 The second country after
Qatar was Algeria, which in 2013 supplied 9.73-bcm.
The main European LNG importers are Spain, the UK,
France, and Italy.
In 2013, due to the large price differential between
the gas prices in Europe and East Asia, European LNG
imports collapsed and represented only 14 percent of
the global LNG trade.175 Instead, Asia has imported
three-quarters of the global LNG volume, which
amounted to 332-bcm in 2013. However, the price differential essentially disappeared in early-2015. For instance, the Japan Korea Marker (JKM) spot price fell to
$6.725 per Million Metric British thermal unit (MMBtu)
in January 2015,176 down from almost $20 per MMBtu
in early-2014.177 In March 2015 (i.e., for April 2015
deliveries), the JKM LNG spot price slightly rose to
$7.279 per MMBtu. Most of the drop in the price level
occurred in the first half of 2014. The main reason for
such a sharp decline has been a decrease in demand
due to a regional economic slowdown, a mild 2014-15
winter in the region, and a lower demand for gas than
expected.178 In addition, in late-2014, Japan restarted
its nuclear reactors. In November 2014, two reactors
at Sendai in the Kagoshima province were approved
to be restarted—the first reactors since the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident.179 The actual restart is planned
for the summer of 2015.180 The restart of nuclear reactors will limit Japan’s massive LNG imports and will
contribute to a lower LNG spot price.
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Algeria, Nigeria, Angola, and Mozambique.
Africa holds large volumes of natural gas and has
great potential, especially off-shore. However, political instability stemming from inadequately developed
institutions, the lack of the rule of law, and corruption
may hinder the future progress of Africa becoming a
major global supplier of LNG.
Algeria is an important source of piped gas for Europe, mainly France. However, it has been a victim of
Islamic radicals who repeatedly target its energy companies and have even kidnapped employees of these
companies. For instance, in early-2013, Islamist militants killed three people and kidnapped more than 40
foreigners working at a gas field.181 In early June 2016,
the Algerian wing of al-Qaeda perpetrated two attacks
on the Algerian military and security forces, killing an
army colonel and four members of a watch brigade.182
Nigerian total estimated gas reserves amount to
over 180-tcf.183 In June 2014, Nigeria voiced readiness
to help the EU with meeting EU long-term gas demands. Currently, Nigeria operates one LNG export
terminal on Bonny Island, owned by Nigeria LNG
Ltd., with a capacity of 22 million metric tons (around
30.5-bcm) per year.184 There is another LNG project in
Nigeria—a so-called Brass LNG Project, which should
be able to produce 10 million metric tons (around 14bcm) of LNG per year.185 The French energy company
Total owns 17 percent of the equity of the project. The
other shareholders are Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (holding 49 percent), ConocoPhillips (17
percent of shares), and ENI (also 17 percent of shares).
However, this project is still only in its early stage of
engineering work, and the year of its launch is not yet
determined.
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Chevron is the largest shareholder in the construction of an LNG export terminal in Angola.186 Other
shareholders are Sonangol, Total, British Petroleum
(BP), and ENI. Its projected capacity is 6.8-bcm per
year. The construction of the terminal has been accompanied by numerous accidents, including multiple electrical fires, pipeline leaks, and a collapse of
a rig.187 The project was originally expected to be fully
launched in 2011, but the series of construction accidents delayed this target by several years. As of May
2015, Chevron expected the terminal to become operational again by the end of 2015.188
Mozambique will be the third sub-Saharan African
country to host an LNG plant after Nigeria and Angola. Mozambique has between 45 and 70-tcf (1.35 to
2-tcm) of estimated recoverable natural gas reserves
in its offshore area.189 The offshore system is expected to produce up to 4-bcf of gas per day (around
41-bcm per year). After its launch, the onshore LNG
infrastructure is expected to produce around 10 million tons (around 14-bcm) per year. U.S. oil company
Anadarko Petroleum is building the first two of the 10
planned LNG plants in Mozambique. The initial plan
of Mozambique was to have the LNG facility ready
by 2018. However, meeting this deadline is not certain.190 Another, more realistic plan is that production
should start in 2021. As of October 2014, work on the
LNG terminal had not started and was in the stage of
governmental approval. Nevertheless, gas companies
from around the world are already concluding deals
on LNG imports from the country.191 The largest deals
so far have been those to ship LNG to China, Japan,
the United Arab Emirates, Thailand, and India.
These LNG projects in review and under construction in sub-Saharan Africa are a positive signal for the
EU. As new suppliers fill the lucrative global LNG
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market and as the oil prices continue to plunge, the
global LNG prices will be pushed downwards. If that
remains the case in the coming years, the EU will be
able to import LNG at lower prices than it is now. That
will provide the Old Continent with a more affordable alternative to Russian piped gas in case of supply
disruptions from Russia.
Eastern Mediterranean.
Europe may not need to reach as far as Africa to
get its fill of gas. Eastern Mediterranean is in the European neighborhood. The main potential gas fields in
the Eastern Mediterranean are in the territorial waters
of Cyprus and Israel. The main gas fields are Tamar,
Leviathan (both Israel), and Aphrodite (Cyprus). The
Tamar field contains approximately 250-bcm of gas
reserves and the larger Leviathan field contains 476bcm. The Aphrodite field contains only 141-bcm of
gas. However, the development of these fields seems
to be problematic due to a range of internal regulatory
disputes (Israel), interstate disputes (Turkey/Cyprus
and Turkey/Israel), and technical difficulties such as
the depth of the sea between Cyprus and Crete.
Offshore gas was found in Israel in 2009.192 Both
Israel and Cyprus have aspired to tap the subsea gas
fields and become suppliers of gas for Europe. However, the potential problems with exploiting these gas
fields are that it is too risky in terms of geography
and politics.
The Eastern Mediterranean is an area with high
seismic activity. The costs of building a pipeline that
would be able to transport gas from these fields to
Europe via Crete and Greece would be too expensive.
According to estimates, its construction would cost
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around $20 billion. Instead, it is more economically
feasible to send the gas from the area to the neighbors, including Jordan and Egypt,193 and/or to build
a pipeline sending the gas from Cyprus and Israel up
to Turkey and Europe. However, Turkey’s President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan refuses to cooperate on a pipeline from Cyprus to Turkey until the Cyprus dispute
is resolved.
Development of these gas fields is also risky politically because of the unresolved issue of the Turkish Northern Cyprus. Turkey does not recognize
EU member Cyprus as an independent country and
strongly opposes drilling activities in the area, including deploying its geophysics research vessel in
Cypriot territorial waters. Ankara has threatened to
use military force to disrupt Cypriot exploration and
production.194
In the meantime, Israel supports Cypriot exploration of the area.195 Tensions escalated in October 2014,
when Turkey sent an exploration ship, accompanied
by two military vessels, into the disputed waters with
Cyprus.196 This led to a suspension of the peace talks
with Turkey by Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiades.
The United States and the EU also condemned the
Turkish move. Given that the development of these
gas fields may lead to great benefits for Europe, Turkey should reduce tensions with Cyprus and Israel
that jeopardize exploration and production of the offshore gas reserves. A potential problem with building a pipeline from Israel and Cyprus to Turkey is the
tense political situation between the two countries and
Ankara, especially after the Israeli raid on the Mevi
Marmara, a Turkish vessel carrying pro-Palestinian Islamist activists of the terrorist-connected charity The
Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms (IHH) in
2010.197
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Another problem with the area is the delimitation
of maritime boundaries between the countries of the
region. This is the case between Israel and Lebanon,
where the absence of an internationally recognized
land border prevents the countries from delimiting
their maritime border. Similar problem exists between
Cyprus and Turkey in the Mediterranean.198 In October 2014, the tensions between the two countries
reached another spike when Turkey sent navy ships
into disputed waters south of Cyprus after the Cypriot government granted permission to Eni SpA to test
drill in the area.199 It remains to be seen if the setback
Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (JDP or AK
Party) suffered in the June 2015 parliamentary elections may improve the energy security climate in the
Eastern Mediterranean.
TURKMENISTAN, TRANS-ANATOLIAN
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE,
AND TRANS ADRIATIC PIPELINE
The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline
(TANAP) and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) are
part of a so-called Southern Gas Corridor. TANAP
and TAP represent a pipeline project that will transport Caspian natural gas from Azerbaijan through
Georgia and Turkey and further into Europe through
Greece and Albania. The construction of TANAP
and TAP began in 2015, and the corridor should become operational in 2018. Azerbaijan will become the
principal supplier of gas to what will be the longest
pipeline project in Europe. Its Shah Deniz I and Shah
Deniz II fields in the Caspian Sea will be the primary
sources of gas for the corridor. The Shah Deniz I started producing gas in 2006 and has a production capac-
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ity of around 10-bcm per year.200 Shah Deniz II, which
should come online in 2018, should supply another 16bcm of gas per year into the system.201 Turkmenistan
has also recently re-emerged as a potential additional
source of gas for this project. After the cancellation of
the Russia-dominated South Stream project, the significance of the Southern Gas Corridor has increased.
Nevertheless, the projected capacity of the entire corridor, which is expected to carry mainly Caspian gas
through Turkey to Southern Europe, is 16 to 20-bcm
per year, with options for an upgrade.
Azerbaijan, which should be the primary source of
gas for the corridor, has supplies from the Shah Deniz
II offshore gas field in the Caspian Sea. The project
will supply 16-bcm annually, 6-bcm of which will be
consumed by Turkey.202 There are plans for the third
stage (Shah Deniz III) after 2025, which could supply
up to an additional 25-bcm per year.203 Other sources
of gas for TANAP potentially could be countries like
Turkmenistan, Iran, or Iraq, all of which have tremendous resources. However, each of these countries has
its own political risk factors that make their supplying
of TANAP uncertain.
Turkmenistan can play a significant role in developing the Southern Gas Corridor, but many observers
are skeptical. In early May 2015, Turkmenistan reaffirmed its commitment to join TANAP, which is to
form a part of the Southern Corridor.204 In particular,
Turkmenistan is interested in connecting its western
gas fields to TANAP, which eventually would allow
it to expand its gas exports to Europe.205 Turkmenistan has the fourth largest gas reserves in the world.
However, Turkmenistan is unlikely to pursue policies
which might jeopardize its relations with Russia—
Turkmenistan’s gas importer and trade partner.206
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Moreover, China, the main Turkmenistan’s gas customer, is likely to object as it invested billions of dollars in the Central Asia-China pipeline, and Beijing
would like to keep the reserves.
Thus, the long-proposed Trans-Caspian Pipeline
continues to be in question. The maximum existing
gas export capacity from Turkmenistan is now close
to 100-bcm per year,207 significantly exceeding that of
Azerbaijan. Most of Turkmenistan’s gas production
currently goes to China.208 Gas is exported through
the Central Asia-China pipeline, the longest gas pipeline built by China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) which transports 55-bcm annually.209 However, Turkmenistan does not have an independent route
by which it could transport the gas to Europe, bypassing Russia. By resisting the demarcation of maritime
borders in the Caspian Sea and especially by refusing
to design a regime for natural resources and mineral
right exploitation, Russia and Iran prevent Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan from building a submarine gas
pipeline between the two countries. Such an interconnector could carry Turkmen gas to the Azerbaijani
Main Export Pipeline and further to Turkey and to
Southern Europe via the Southern Gas Corridor and
its TANAP/TAP pipelines.
Russia therefore secures its own position as a buyer and re-exporter of Turkmen gas, or at least blocks
its exports, which contributes to maintaining its oligopolistic position in the European gas market. In the
meantime, Turkmenistan is focusing on selling its gas
to the East and South, most importantly to China and
to Iran.210 While Iran continues to be a market and a
potential transit country for Turkmen gas (Iran now
buys approximately 10 percent of Turkmen gas exports to supply its northern provinces), it is commit-
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ted to increase domestic production and end imports
from its northern neighbor.211 Turkmenistan could
become an important alternative source of gas for
Europe, as Norway and Algeria already are.
Norway.
Russia and Eurasia are not the sole suppliers of gas
to Europe. Norway, a NATO member, is also a significant source of gas. According to the EIA, Norway supplies more than 20 percent of Europe’s gas demand.212
In 2013, Norway supplied 21 percent of Europe’s gas
needs. After Russia and Qatar, Norway is the world’s
third largest exporter of gas. In 2013, most of Norway’s
gas exports reached the UK, Germany, and France.
Norway has little potential to boost its exports to
the EU in case of need, however.213 In the wintertime,
the capacity of Norway’s gas system is almost fully
utilized, as European demand increases seasonally.
There is a limited capacity for an increase in production and export from Norway’s continental shelf. For
a short time in season, Norway is able to provide up
to 130 million cubic meters of gas for exports daily.214
However, countries like Bulgaria, Slovakia, or Hungary, which depend more on Russian gas than does
Western Europe, have enough gas stored in their underground reservoirs for around 3 months. Therefore,
Norway cannot be counted upon to be able to replace
shortfalls in Russian gas supplies in the short run, but
switching the Baltic States to Norwegian gas makes
sense.
In the long run, Norway does not look like a promising source of gas for the EU. According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, in the first half of 2014,
despite an increase in demand, Norway’s overall gas
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production slightly decreased by 2.5 percent compared to the same period of 2013.215 Forecasts predicting a meaningful increase in Norway’s gas output in
the future are unavailable. Yet, there are additional
and massive sources of natural gas for Europe, such
as Iran.
Iran.
Iran has the second largest gas reserves in the
world, after Russia. In early May 2014, Iran proposed
the EU compensate potential cutoffs of Russian gas
due to the war of sanctions between Russia and the
West.216 However, this Iranian initiative was unrealistic due to the sanctions regime, which the United Nations (UN) imposed on Iran in order to stop its nuclear
program. Until the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed in Vienna, Austria, by China, France,
Russia, the UK, the United States, Germany (the P5 +
1), and the Islamic Republic on July 14, 2015,217 gaining hydrocarbon supplies from Iran was unrealistic.
Today, however, the situation is changing rapidly.
Companies such as ENI, Shell, Total, and others have
already beaten a track to Teheran’s energy decisionmakers’ doors.218 While Iran is not ready to supply
gas to Europe either through pipelines or in the LNG
form, an all-out effort to change this will take place.
The pipeline through Turkey is available, and can
currently supply up to 20-bcm a year, with Turkey
buying about 10-bcm. With upgrades, that pipeline
can supply up to 25 to 30-bcm annually in as little as 2
years. An additional pipeline is feasible, but funding
and construction may take 5 years or more. Reserves
are not the issue—financing, negotiating the right
deal, and supplying technology is. Furthermore, Iran
is undoubtedly willing to enter the LNG market, and
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will be able to supply Europe via LNG tankers. However, even if the Western sanctions on Iran were lifted
immediately, it would take years for Iran to be able
to export meaningful amounts of gas to Europe due
to lacking appropriate gas production and transport
infrastructure.
First, Iran has no LNG liquefaction terminal, and
therefore Iran does not export any LNG. The Iranian government launched a project called Iran LNG,
which foresees construction of an LNG terminal in
the city of Tombak in the Busher region, which also is
hosting the first Iranian commercial nuclear reactor.219
Nevertheless, the lack of Iran’s access to modern LNG
technologies because of the sanctions, which prohibit
Western firms from exporting technology for Iran’s oil
and gas industry, has constrained the project. Shortage
of capital is another militating factor. Thus, Iran needs
to rely on pipelines for exports of gas. However, the
Iranian pipeline’s gas export is problematic due to the
country’s insufficient and obsolete infrastructure. Currently, the only country to which Iran exports meaningful amounts of gas is Turkey. In 2011, the amount
of trade with natural gas between the two countries
was 8.4-bcm through the Tabriz-Ankara Pipeline. In
2015, the amount of projected trade in gas increased
to around 10-bcm.220 However, the export of the gas to
Europe is impractical due to the lack of infrastructure
and the current war in Iraq.
The annual capacity of the Tabriz-Ankara Pipeline
is only 14-bcm.221 Besides this pipeline, there is also
a project of the so-called Persian Pipeline, started in
2009.222 The pipeline would run from Iran through
Turkey and further to Europe. The Iranian part should
be 1,740-km long, with a projected capacity of up to
40-bcm per year. This pipeline was planned to become
operational by 2014, which did not happen due to
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sanctions. Even if these pipelines were built, reliability
of the supply from Iran would be questionable. Since
its launch in 2002, the Tabriz-Ankara Pipeline has experienced disruption due to attacks by Kurdish separatists in the north of Iran and in southeast Turkey. In
late-2012, Kurdish violent separatist and the terrorist
group the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) bombed
the pipeline, wounding 28 Turkish soldiers.223 The security in this area has also deteriorated because of the
civil war in Syria and Iraq, which affected southern
Turkey as well. In addition to these attacks, Iran itself also has a dubious record of ensuring stable gas
supplies to Turkey, as it has repeatedly reduced or cut
off exports to Turkey as needed to satisfy its domestic
supply.
Another factor that jeopardizes the prospects of
Iranian gas exports to Turkey and to Europe are the
Western sanctions imposed on Iran. These sanctions
forced Turkey to lower its imports of Iranian gas,
which in turn makes Turkey more dependent on Russia. In particular, the EU imposed sanctions on Iran’s
gas sector already under sanctions in October 2012,
which precludes Iranian gas exports to the EU. Two
other of Iran’s LNG projects—Pars LNG and Persian
LNG—were canceled due to the sanctions.224 Even if
this pipeline allowed higher export capacity, there is
currently no pipeline that would be able to transport
the gas further west from Turkey to Europe. The Nabucco pipeline project, which was proposed back in
2002 and expected to carry gas from the Caspian Sea
and possibly Iran to Europe, bypassing Russia and
Ukraine, has been abandoned.225
Thus, Iran’s capabilities to become a source of gas
for Europe are limited for now, but may improve in
the future. Were its rulers to pursue a rational state
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interest, they should be making an supreme effort not
just to lift the sanctions, but address the root causes
which triggered these measures: a dangerous nuclear
build-up program, including the full cycle of uranium
enrichment; the expansion of the medium range ballistic missile arsenal; and support of terrorism.
With the deal announced, Russia needs to start
viewing Iran as a major gas exporter. Europe is likely
to diversify its supply by buying 20-40-bcm a year
from Teheran.
Northern Iraq/Kurdistan: U.S. Assistance Needed.
An alternative source of gas for Europe may be
northern Iraq, known as Iraqi Kurdistan and administered by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).226
The overall Iraqi estimated gas resources are around
1.7 percent of the total estimated world’s supplies.227
According to the KRG, in the north of Iraq the estimated conventional gas reserves of the region alone are
165-tcf (4.95-tcm) of gas, out of which 38-tcf (1.14-tcm)
of gas is recoverable.228 However, unlike the existing
oil pipelines, there are currently no gas pipelines from
Northern Iraq to Turkey, which could transport this
gas to Turkey and further to Europe if the gas reserves
were tapped. Therefore, Turkey is looking at two basic options: ensuring exports from northern Iraq itself
or transforming northern Iraq into a transit corridor
for the gas from the rest of the country and possibly
from Iran.
However, Northern Iraq remains a problematic
supplier of gas even if its gas fields do become connected to the Turkish gas grid and the future hub for
Europe. For now, Northern Iraq, together with the rest
of the country, continues to suffer from a high level of
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volatility due to the Islamic State (IS)/Daesh operations and the unresolved issue of Kurdish autonomy.
U.S. and Turkish military assistance is needed, including training and equipment, to make the Kurds
capable of managing security risks to their energy infrastructure, as mentioned in the next section.
Another project would be the connection of the
Turkish and Iraqi gas networks to the Arab Gas Pipeline. The Arab Gas Pipeline runs from Egypt, bypasses
Israel, runs north through Jordan and Syria, and ends
in the Syrian city of Homs. From the security standpoint, this pipeline is hopeless as Syria is in the midst
of a civil war, and it is currently not connected to the
Turkish territory. Moreover, as with Egyptian gas,
production is falling, and, as Cairo is planning to buy
gas from the offshore Israeli fields, the value of the
Arab pipeline is in doubt. In fact, one day it can be
reversed to ship Iraqi gas to Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.
Libya: A Country in Search of a State.
In addition to the Middle East, Libya also remains
an important potential source of gas for Europe. However, Libya faces systemic instability, which prevents
its gas potential from adequate development.
Libya has massive resources of natural gas. Its
proven natural gas reserves reach 1.5-tcm,229 however, the Libyan conflict has drastically affected its
gas production. While in 2010 the country produced
30.3-bcm of gas in total, in 2011 the number fell more
than threefold—to just 9.9-bcm.230 In 2012 and 2013,
the production partially recovered, reaching 23.4 and
22.9-bcm in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Thus, Libya
has enough potential to increase its exports to Europe
by around 10-bcm per year.231 Libya’s natural gas is
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exported to Europe through the Greenstream (part of
the Western Libya Gas Project) underwater pipeline to
Sicily. The pipeline has a capacity of 11-bcm per year.
Libya has not been able to build a significant LNG capacity due to the technical limitations resulting from
Western sanctions against the late Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi’s regime in the 2000s and from the turmoil
after his removal from power in late-2011. With the
collapse of the Libyan statehood post-2011 Western
intervention, the chances to expand Libyan gas production and exports remain grim.
If the political risk environment improves in the
future, and a stable regime or regimes are in place,
Libya is likely to return to be an important gas supplier for Europe. The U.S. Army can provide training
and equipment to the future Libyan military when
a stable national government is reinstated, or if the
country is permanently divided.
Algeria is the third most important supplier of natural gas to Europe, after Norway and Russia. It may
also become a transit area for gas from Nigeria. The
planned Trans-Saharan natural gas pipeline would
have a capacity of 30-bcm per year and should run
from Nigerian gas fields through Niger to Algeria,
from where the gas would continue to flow further
north to Italy and Spain. The deal for the construction
of the pipeline was signed in Nigeria in 2009.232 However, security concerns due to the volatile situation
along the entire pipeline route, as well as the ongoing
regulatory and political uncertainty in Nigeria, have
continued to delay this project. In 2014, Nigeria’s thenpresident, Goodluck Jonathan, said that he expects to
have the Nigerian segment of the pipeline completed
by 2018.233 However, even if the Nigerian section of
the pipeline gets built, it is far from certain whether
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this pipeline will become operational in the foreseeable future. The Nigeria-Algeria-Europe pipeline
remains a long shot.
U.S. INTERESTS, THE U.S. MILITARY,
THE U.S. ARMY, AND EUROPEAN
ENERGY SECURITY
General.
The United States is interested in the economic stability and growth of Europe, as the EU is the principal and the largest trade partner of the United States.
The United States and the EU have the largest trade
and investment relationship in the world.234 This relationship has persevered through the 2007-08 financial
crisis. In 2014 alone, the American economy exported
goods and services totaling $276.7 billion to Europe.235
This transatlantic economic interconnectedness means
that the U.S. economic growth and stability partly depends on the economic developments in Europe, and
vice versa. As the United States is now and is likely to
continue to be interested in a strong and stable European market, the European energy security indirectly
contributes to U.S. economic stability. Moreover, this
mutual economic integration and dependence between the United States and the EU may be further
deepened when the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement (TTIP) is successfully
concluded and enters into force. Finalizing this agreement seems to be no easy task, and TTIP has already
failed one congressional vote.236
Europe’s energy security is not something that can
be improved overnight. Therefore, it is in the U.S. interest to support Europe’s efforts at achieving better
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energy security now and in the years to come. European electricity production and heat for households
are inconceivable without a steady supply of natural
gas, most of it imported to Europe from neighbors,
near and far. Thus, the United States, as an ally and
a security partner of Europe, is interested in the continent’s energy security and an uninterrupted inflow
of natural gas by pipe in the form of LNG, and in local development of natural gas production in Europe,
including from shale.
Europe’s energy independence is not only in the
economic interest of America, but also in its political and security interests. Europe’s dependence on
Russian natural gas undermines European unity and
weakens the primary U.S. allies in their relations with
Russia. The involvement, increased deployment, and
enhanced training activities of the U.S. military in
Central and Eastern Europe will send a clear message
to Russia: “pull in your horns” and stop the escalation.
If this signal is received in Moscow, it will also make
the flow of energy resources from Russia to Europe
more stable and will put a disincentive on Putin’s use
of energy as a weapon. With Europe independent of
Russian pressure, it may become a more valuable U.S.
ally in pursing Western interests around the globe, including fighting terror in the Middle East, balancing
the rising China, etc.
While the United States has rapidly improved its
energy independence in the past decade and has great
potential to continue doing so, Europe is in a far more
complex situation, encircled by the volatile Middle
East and North Africa region to the south and Russia
to the east. Any turmoil in Europe’s energy situation
may adversely affect American exporters selling their
goods and services in Europe. Thus, the time to act for
both the United States and Europe is now.
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Energy Policy Recommendations.
The principal recommendation to the U.S. Government is to impose as few restrictions as possible in the
way of future U.S. LNG exports to Europe. The pace of
construction of the LNG terminals in the United States
capable of exporting meaningful amounts of LNG to
Europe is falling behind the more rapidly developing
terminals in Canada and Australia.237 Not far behind
are large-scale developments in offshore Africa.238
Lifting the restrictions would be a major signal to potential American LNG exporters that the future cash
flow from their large investments in constructing LNG
terminals will not be hindered by restrictions imposed
by the U.S. Government. Before the West imposed its
sanctions on Russia, Gazprom was also ahead of the
game regarding natural gas exports to Europe. Therefore, while Europe builds the new LNG terminals, its
alternative is to continue importing relatively cheap
Russian piped gas, and at the same time expand its
non-Russian piped supplies, such as the Southern
Gas Corridor from the Caspian region, together with
importing LNG.
The United States can also advocate and champion
the construction of the intra-European gas interconnector network, which is in dire need of massive funding. Currently, EU funding, including financing under
the so-called “Juncker package,” is considered as one
of the alternatives.239 However, U.S. capacities and
expertise in this regard may bring great value to the
construction of the interconnector network and, most
importantly, to the finalization of the reversible northsouth gas pipeline route through Central Europe from
the Baltic to the Adriatic, in the shortest time possible.
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Recommendations for the U.S. Military.
The U.S. Armed Forces play an important role
in providing European security since World War II.
Today, the U.S. military’s role in European energy
security can be summarized as follows:
•	
Conduct a comprehensive assessment of the security of European energy imports, including
natural gas, coal, uranium, and oil. Monitor the
threats to pipelines and to the natural gas balance through the U.S. intelligence community
and their counterparts in Europe, Turkey, and
the Middle East. Share intelligence where possible. Additionally, conduct open sources analysis of the security of Europe’s energy supply
through the available, high quality, nongovernment expertise in think tanks and the private
sector.
•	
Develop in cooperation with NATO, European
Command, and Central Command, a system
to monitor threats to critical energy infrastructure. The EU also needs a system of monitoring
threats to the intra-European gas network. Interconnectors will become the key component
of European gas independence from Russia
and need to be monitored properly. In particular, the U.S. Army should develop joint threat
assessment and emergency planning and response protocols for threats to individual gas
fields, pipelines, gas processing facilities, storage facilities, pumping stations, and other crucial infrastructure components.
•	
Ensure that NATO and individual European
and Middle Eastern-North African countries
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have interoperability standards and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures which would
allow them to coordinate and interact in case of
the threats to the natural gas infrastructure as
recently seen in Algeria.240
Recommendations for the U.S. Army.
The U.S. Army deployed in Europe is a crucial
component providing NATO and regional security,
interacting with NATO and non-NATO allies, and
assisting in training these allies’ militaries. The U.S.
Army should:
•	
Cooperate with NATO, national militaries of
NATO members and non-NATO allies, their
intelligence services and law enforcement, as
well as with energy companies to ensure security of pipelines and other gas facilities. The
crucial infrastructure components of the EU
natural gas energy security are the Main Export Pipelines coming from Russia/Ukraine
and North Africa, the system of gas hubs (such
as Baumgarten in Austria), and pipeline interconnectors between the European countries, as
well as LNG import terminals.
•	
Use its expertise and capacity to help the allies
in Central Europe protect the interconnectors,
as one cannot exclude an attempt of Russia to
sabotage this crucial infrastructure. In particular, the emphasis needs to be put on training
and equipping our Central and Eastern European NATO allies, as well as Ukraine and
Moldova. To properly identify weak spots and
ensure the security of pipelines and other gas
facilities, the U.S. Army needs to ensure it con-
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ducts an accurate assessment/security audit
of each interconnector security challenge and
potential threat.
•	
Prepare for energy crisis-related disaster relief
in Europe in cooperation with European militaries in the NATO framework and the EU and
national emergency responders, and build on
its experience in developing infrastructure protection plans in the United States and around
the world to outline similar plans, programs,
and procedures in Europe. In case of a future
disruption of Russian gas supplies to Europe,
Europe would be able to weather the crisis better if it had a joint plan with the United States
instead of trying to find an ad hoc solution.
•	
Train forces for critical energy infrastructure
protection. The United States has developed an
effective system of critical infrastructure protection at home and can share its expertise with
its European allies.
•	
Train and equip local militaries and other
forces for energy infrastructure protection and
actively pursue those who are trying to destroy energy infrastructure. Thus, the struggle
against violent religious extremists is directly
connected to U.S. efforts to keep oil and gas
infrastructure, the electricity grids, ports, and
airports secure. The U.S. Army can and should
cooperate in the design of local military and
security components and units, as well as the
strategy and tactics necessary to ensure both
intelligence gathering and the hard security
aspects of critical energy infrastructure protection. In particular, this should apply to the energy-rich countries of North Africa and Sahel,
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including Nigeria, Chad, Algeria, Libya, and
Tunisia. The United States should also evaluate the needs and capabilities of the Kurdish
forces, which already are cooperating with the
United States in fighting the IS/Dasesh. A clear
distinction between the operational requirements of the war against the IS and long-term
infrastructure protection needs to be made by
evaluators.
•	
Temporarily protect critical energy facilities
and infrastructure. When the United States is
in the process of training the European forces
to protect the intra-European gas infrastructure, the United States should use its own capabilities to ensure proper protection of the infrastructure until European forces are capable to
perform these tasks on their own.
CONCLUSIONS: DIMINISHING EUROPE’S
DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN GAS—
A U.S.-EUROPEAN POLICY GOAL WHOSE
TIME HAS ARRIVED
Due to the lack of new viable gas pipeline routes
from alternative geographic sources and a generally
negative attitude in Europe towards shale gas production, the only viable alternative for Europe is to
speed up pipeline construction from the continent’s
periphery. Europe should also substitute some of the
Russian gas with LNG imports from North America,
while developing Eastern Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa as sources of gas. These goals should be
achieved in the 2019-25 timeframe.
Unfortunately, Russia has proven to be an unreliable gas supplier because it merges business with pol-
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itics. Unlike in the West, where international energy
companies pursue profits and as a rule refrain from
pressure on particular countries, Russia’s Gazprom
is majority state-owned and is a tool in the hands of
the Kremlin. Beyond this ostensible strength, Russia’s
weakness in the international arena is its unpredictability. The Kremlin has a record of making shortsighted decisions aimed at maximizing its short-term
geopolitical gains at the expense of maximizing the
long-term economic ones. Natural gas cannot be used
as a weapon and a commodity at the same time just
like oil eventually lost the might it enjoyed throughout the 1970s.
Gas discounts may have worked as carrots for
certain countries and swayed political decisions in
Russia’s favor. Gazprom charges the Baltic States
the highest prices because, for a while, they have the
weakest alternative sources. Deliberate gas disruptions to Ukraine may have forced the latter to pay at
least part of its bills. However, Russia and Gazprom
seem not to have taken into account that the world is
not a static place. The fact that some countries had to
provide foreign policy concessions to the Kremlin to
restore gas supplies at one time does not mean that
it will be the case forever. The fact that some countries are charged more than others merely for political
reasons will not last forever, either. This shortsighted
Russian behavior incentivizes Europe to seek alternative sources of gas other than Russia, which in the
long run will economically hurt both sides. It will hurt
Europe, which has to invest into interconnectors, new
LNG facilities, and other infrastructure that would not
be necessary should Russia be a liberalized country
with competitive gas supplies. It hurts Russia, which
is in the process of losing the European markets.
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In the world of international commerce, predictability comes from the transparency of legislative
and regulatory bodies, the rule of law, and businessfriendly regulation, which together contribute to the
efficiency of the business and economic system. Free
market competition based on the rule of law allows
one to expect that, if there is a demand, someone
would supply a commodity to the customers. Russia
has been demonstrating that this principle is not valid
in the case of Gazprom. Through the 1990s, 2006, 2009,
and as recently as 2014, Russia proved repeatedly that
its partners cannot count on Gazprom, even when it
cuts prices and accommodates other demands.
Europe cannot afford to be Gazprom’s hostage—or
become a pawn in Russian-Ukrainian hostilities when
Ukraine cannot pay Gazprom for the gas it delivered.
In such circumstances, if Gazprom were to be a reliable supplier, it would have to manage Ukrainian
debt and work on its resolution together with the EU.
The best way for Europe to deal with this lack of predictability is to secure alternative supplies of natural
gas. Given the lack of readily available sources of additional piped gas, the alternative for Europe is LNG,
especially after the collapse of the Asian prices. The
EU does not need to invest heavily in building new
LNG terminals to use this option, as the excess capacity in Spain and elsewhere is vast. All it has to do is
to expand the intra-European gas pipeline network,
pay higher prices, and wait for the export LNG terminals under construction in North America and offshore West and East Africa to come online. The shale
gas revolution that took place in the United States in
the last decade will allow the United States to support
its European allies by ensuring them with a safe and
predictable alternative, even if it is more expensive
than the gas Europe gets from Russia: American LNG
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exporters will mainly seek profit and are likely to
prioritize on Asian markets.
Nevertheless, both the LNG and the future alternative pipelines will offset Russia’s advantage in the gas
price and regulatory negotiations between the EU and
Gazprom. Russia can go without the gas revenues from
the EU for significantly longer than the EU can survive
without Russian gas, but until Russia finds new gas
markets, and Europe new gas sources, they are locked
in a symbiotic embrace. With U.S. and African LNG as
alternatives, and a step towards a permanent solution,
this asymmetry might virtually go away. That would
strengthen Europe’s energy security and put the EU
countries’ relations vis-à-vis Russia on a more equal
playing field. The U.S. military, and especially the U.S.
Army, should be there to make it happen.
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